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/. JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction conferred by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(j) as a case transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
//. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Appellant Sittner's appeal of the Third District Court's summary judgment 
presents the following issues for review: 
1. Does a Utah judgment lien attached to a debtor's real property before he files 
bankruptcy and receives a discharge remain enforceable against the property following case 
closing and abandonment of the property back to the debtor? 
2. Did Sittner's filing of a bankruptcy claim marked "unsecured" his signing of 
a stipulation with the bankruptcy trustee waiving any right to assert a secured claim in 
property or funds of the estate, but preserving his rights respecting property abandoned by 
the estate or not administered by closing, and his receiving a distribution from the estate to 
unsecured claims have the effect of waiving Sittner's judgment lien on property abandoned 
to debtor Gildea upon case closing? 
3. Did the eight year statute of limitations for enforcing Sittner's Utah judgment 
expire during the pendency of this action? 
4. Did the trial judge err in awarding Defendants attorney's fees under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-56 for Sittner filing an action for declaratory relief? 
1 
5. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in not granting Sittner's motion to strike 
portions of Defendants' memoranda that contained opinions of other judges, offered to 
support Defendants' third motion for summary judgment and in considering such opinions 
in reversing himself for the third time and granting summary judgment? 
///. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Sittner's appeal is from the trial court's grant of summary judgment of dismissal and 
awarding attorney's fees and accordingly the applicable standard of review for issues one through 
five is that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a 
question of law, no deference is accorded the trial court's resolution of legal issues presented. This 
court determines only if the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial 
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Id. In reviewing summary 
judgment, this court views the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the losing party [Sittner]. Id. at 233. Also applicable to Sittner's appeal of the 
summary judgment, the trial court should not make findings of fact in a summary judgment other 
than a restatement of the undisputed facts stated in favor of the non-moving party. Dubois v. Grand 
Central, 872 R2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1994). 
The standard of review for issue number six on the trial court's failure to grant Sittner's 
motion to strike and preclude consideration of the opinion of the bankruptcy court after the 
bankruptcy order was reversed and vacated by the U.S. District Court is equivalent to a 
2 
determination of the admissibility of evidence for purposes of a motion for summary judgment and 
is reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard. Ratline v Barker, 912 P.2d 433,441 (Utah 1996). 
IV. DETERMINA TIVE ST A TUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 (1992) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied 
or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
In November 1985, Sittner obtained a money judgment against Defendant Bruce 
Gildea. In December of 1985, Sittner had execution proceedings issue on the judgment and 
the county sheriff recorded a notice of real estate levy and set an execution sale on the 
judgment lien on Gildea's real property, which sale was suspended when Gildea filed 
bankruptcy in January 1986. In bankruptcy, Gildea received a Chapter 7 discharge of 
personal liability, elected and received his Utah homestead exemption on property other than 
the Sittner judgment lien property. The lien property was scheduled in the bankruptcy, but 
was neither sold nor administered for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and Gildea 
continued to be in possession and an owner after the bankruptcy case closing in April 1992. 
On August 3,1993, Sittner filed this action in the district court under the Declaratory 
Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1, et. seq., for declaratory relief that his judgment 
lien was still attached to the real property, survived Gildea's bankruptcy, had an unsatisfied 
judgment balance in excess of $30,000, that Gildea could not claim another homestead and 
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Sittner was entitled to direct the sheriff to complete the execution sale suspended by Gildea's 
prior bankruptcy, and for a determination of Defendants' rights, interests and priorities in the 
property. [Complaint, Rec, l-ll; copy Appdx. 1], 
Gildeas' answer admitted Gildea's homestead exemption had been used on other 
property, that Gildea was still an owner in continuous possession, and that the property had 
been abandoned to him from the bankruptcy estate, but asserted that Sittnefs lien claim was 
barred by Gildea's Chapter 7 bankruptcy and by the statute of limitations. [Gildeas' Answer, 
Rec,30-33 ]. The other Defendants answered, admitted having an interest in the property, 
but asserted that Sittner's lien was discharged by Gildea's bankruptcy and barred by the 
statute of limitations. [See answers, Rec. 34-43], 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition, 
After some written discovery, cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and on 
May 18,1994, Judge Wilkinson granted summary judgment for Defendants dismissing the 
action [Rec, 331] concluding that judgments do not survive a bankruptcy discharge [Tr. p.3, 
Rec. 273], and awarding Defendants attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann, §78-27-56 saying 
that Sittner's "suit is not well taken, is a frivolous suit,,.." with no mention of or finding of 
bad faith. [Tr, p. 3,4, Rec. 213-21 A], 
Subsequently on Plaintiff Sittner's motion, the court reconsidered its ruling and on 
September 7, 1994, the court entered an order vacating the prior summary judgment and 
granting partial summary judgment for Sittner that his judgment and lien survived the 
bankruptcy and remained enforceable in rem against the subject property, concluding that 
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a discharge does not render a judgment lien invalid but only precludes liability of the debtor 
personally, nor was the judgment avoided in the course of Giidea's bankruptcy or by the prior 
stipulation made between Sittner and Gildea's bankruptcy trustee which expressly preserved 
the judgment lien on the specific real property which was the subject of the action. The court 
reserved ruling on the statute of limitations and on the amount remaining due on the 
judgment. [See Order, Rec. 458-464; copy Appdx. 2\. 
On March 10, 1995, Sittner moved for partial summary judgment on the reserved 
issues of the statute of limitations and the balance due on the judgment, and requested the 
court to authorize the sheriff to complete the execution sale long suspended by Gildea's 
bankruptcy. [Rec. 469-488]. Schriever in response reasserted her entire first motion for 
summary judgment [Rec. 510-525], but after the motions were submitted for decision [Rec. 
550], Gildea moved for a stay of proceedings so he could move to reopen his bankruptcy case 
and seek relief in the bankruptcy court and by Minute Entry of April 21, 1995, Judge 
Wilkinson granted the stay. [Rec. 567]. 
Gildea was successful in obtaining a bankruptcy order adverse to Plaintiff Sittner and 
based thereon on August 15,1995 (the trial court) granted Defendants' summary judgment 
of dismissal and awarded them attorneys' fees. [Rec. 735]. However on October 10,1995, 
Sittner obtained an order staying further proceedings pending review of the bankruptcy order 
by the U.S. District Court and providing that if the bankruptcy order was reversed that the 
trial court's judgment, findings and conclusions of August 15,1995, that were based on issue 
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preclusion, would be automatically vacated and ftirther proceedings could then ensue in the 
case. [Rec. 939-941 and Rec. 1000-1002; copy Appdx. 3]. 
On July 16,1996, the U.S. District Court reversed and vacated the bankruptcy order. 
[Rec. 1042-1045]. Unfortunately the court's opinion included unnecessary commentary 
endorsing the bankruptcy's judge's conclusions. 
On August 8, 1996, Sittner served requests for supplementation of prior discovery 
responses and after receiving no responses and sending inquiry letters to opposing counsel 
with no response; on October 24,1996, Sittner moved to compel discovery and for an award 
of attorney's fees. [Rec. 945-970]. All such discovery motions were submitted for decision 
of the court by notice on November 14, 1996 [Rec. 1003] and December 10, 1996 [Rec. 
1053]. 
On January 14,1997, Schriever filed her third motion for summary judgment offering 
no new facts or analysis other than including the bankruptcy judge's opinion and federal 
district judge's endorsement of it, and based thereon asserted Defendants' right to have the 
prior summary judgment reinstated. [Rec. 1061-1126]. Giidea joined in the motion [Rec. 
1141]. Sittner responded by objecting to and moving to strike the unfounded facts and 
improper conclusions under Rule 56(e) and the improper bankruptcy opinions and again 
moved for summary judgment on the reserved issues. [Rec. 1154-1237]. 
On March 25,1997, the court granted summary judgment for Defendants dismissing 
Sittner's complaint with prejudice and awarding attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-
26-56 in an amount to be determined. [Judgment, Rec. 1257-1258, Findings and 
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Conclusions, Rec. 1250-1255; copies Appdx. 4]. The court's third reversal of decision was 
brought about by the nullified bankruptcy opinion improperly included by Defendants in their 
brief, which was the only new ground asserted, which they argued strenuously [Tr. 1644, 
p.6,7], which Judge Wilkinson admitted considering in reaching his decision that Sittner's 
judgment was waived in Gildea's bankruptcy. [See Tr. p. 4, Rec. 1245-1249, copy Appdx. 
5]. On October 21, 1997, judgment was entered awarding Defendants' attorneys' fees of 
$37,250 [Rec. 1541-1543]. On November 14,1997, Sittner filed a Notice of Appeal from 
the entire judgment and proceedings, including the March 25, 1997, summary judgment. 
[Rec. 1549]. 
C. Appellate Proceedings and Disposition. 
In December of 1997, Schriever moved for summary dismissal of Sittner's appeal as 
untimely filed. In January of 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the appeal and 
pending motion to the court of appeals. On July 9, 1998, the court of appeals filed a 
memorandum decision [Rec. 1573] dismissing Sittner's appeal as untimely. Sittner filed a 
petition for rehearing and after the court called for and reviewed responses, rehearing was 
denied by order of September 30,1998. 
Sittner petitioned for certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court and on May 
19,2000, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded this 
case back for a full review of the merits of Sittner's appeal. Sittner v. Schriever, et aL, 2000 
UT 45 [copy Appdx. 6]. 
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D. Statement of Facts. 
Sittner responded to the statement of facts set forth in Schriever's third motion for 
summary judgment by objecting to certain unfounded facts and improper conclusions and 
moving to strike the same under Rule 56(e) [Rec. 1154-1164]. Some of these unfounded 
facts and improper conclusions are in the findings of fact adopted by the court [Rec. 1250-
1255]. However because resolution was by summary judgment, Sittner ignores the findings 
and particularly the improper portions and asserts that the undisputed facts properly in the 
record for summary judgment are as follows: 
1. On November 25, 1985, Sittner was granted judgment for recovery of 
approximately $34,000 against Bruce Gildea, which was filed and docketed in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. [Exhibit "B" to Sittner's Complaint, Rec. 10; 
admitted in Gildea's Answer, ^|6, Rec. 31]. 
2. Under Utah law, docketing the judgment created a lien upon Gildeas' real 
property in Salt Lake County, including a lien upon Gildeas' one-half ownership interest in 
property at 2400 East 3000 South (the "subject property") Gildea and his wife were 
purchasing from Defendant Hale under a uniform real estate contract. [Admitted Gildeas' 
Answer %5, Rec. 31; Rec. 1070, %\ ]. 
3. Sittner caused execution proceedings to issue on the judgment and on 
December 30,1985, the county sheriff filed for record with the Salt Lake County Recorder 
a Writ of Execution and Notice of Real Estate Levy against Gildea's interest in the subject 
property and the sheriff served the Writ on Gildeas and posted and published notice of 
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execution sale. [Exhibit "C" to Plaintiffs Complaint, Rec. 12-15; Mabey Aff. p , Rec. 135-
138]. 
4. On January 16, 1986, just before Sittner's execution sale of the subject 
property, Bruce Gildea filed for bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District 
of Utah. [GillmanAff. %L9 Rec. 93]. 
5. As a result of Gildea's bankruptcy filing, Sittner's attorney received notice of 
the "automatic stay" preventing the execution sale of the subject property and he notified the 
sheriff to suspend further proceedings until the automatic stay was no longer in effect. 
[Mabey Aff. f4, Rec. 135-138]. 
6. Early in the bankruptcy case, Sittner filed a standard form "Proof of Claim9' 
which attached a copy of Sittner's judgment against Gildea as evidencing the debt and 
indicated the judgment was security for the claim, but marked the claim box as "unsecured" 
based upon Sittner's belief that the security interest then had no recoverable value to satisfy 
the judgment. [Gillman Aff. |3 , Rec. 93-95; copy Proof of Claim, Rec. 95 and Appdx. 7]. 
7. On December 14,1987, Gildea received a Chapter 7 discharge [Rec. 99], and 
during his bankruptcy case, Gildea elected to use and receive the full benefit of his Utah 
homestead exemption on property other than the subject property. [Admitted in Gildeas' 
Answer ^ 10, Rec. 31]. 
8. In June of 1989, Gildea's bankruptcy trustee commenced an adversary 
proceeding against Sittner seeking to avoid Sittner's judgment lien as a preferential transfer 
under 11 U.S.C. §547. The action was settled by written stipulation signed by Sittner and 
9 
the trustee on August 10,1989, whereby Sittner agreed to waive any right to assert a secured 
claim in property or proceeds of the bankruptcy estate, and agreed he would have an 
unsecured prepetition claim for claims administration, but Sittner's rights under the judgment 
respecting property abandoned by the estate or not administered by closing would be 
preserved and unaffected. The stipulation was subject to court approval and was approved 
by a bankruptcy order. [Gillman Aff. f4, Rec. 94, copy Stipulation, Rec. 98-99 and copy in 
Appdx. 8; Mabey Aff. f s 5,6, 7, Rec. 135-138]. 
9. In December of 1991, Sittner received a check from the bankruptcy trustee for 
$4,033 representing a distribution on Sittner's unsecured claim of $36,228 [Rec. 1072 at f9; 
Rec. 1121]. After Sittner applied the distribution to the judgment debt, there still remained 
a balance owed in excess of $30,000. [Sittner Aff. f5, Rec. 130-131]. 
10. The subject property and Gildea's interest in it was a scheduled asset of 
Gildea's bankruptcy estate [Rec. 1071 at [^4] and throughout the case Gildea remained in 
possession and after closing Gildea continued to be an owner of the one-half interest in the 
subject property. [Admitted in Gildea's Answer \\ 2, Rec. 32; and Rec. 1074 at Tf 16]. 
11. The subject property was not sold by the trustee or otherwise administered for 
the benefit of the estate, since the trustee had determined that there was not sufficient equity 
available to benefit the estate and he intended to abandon the property, but no formal order 
of abandonment was made or entered and so it was deemed abandoned to Gildea upon 
bankruptcy case closing on April 24,1992. [Sittner Aff. ^ f's 6 and 7, Rec. 130-132; Mabey 
10 
Aff. f 8, Rec. 137-138; Gildea admitted property abandoned to him in Gildeas' Answer f 11, 
Rec. 32]. 
12. Several months after the closure of Gildea's bankruptcy case, Sittner decided 
to complete the long-suspended execution sale on the subject property and thus obtained a 
search of the public title records and discovered a warranty deed recorded August 1992 from 
Defendant Hale as grantor conveying the subject property to Defendant Schriever, Shirlynn 
Gildea's sister, which made no reference to or exception from the warranties for Gildeas' 
ownership. Sittner investigated farther and found that Gildeas were still in possession of the 
subject property. [See Complaint [^13 and Exhibit "A" (Warranty Deed), Rec. 4, 9; 
Schriever's drawer If's 13,19, Rec. 36]. 
13. Given the title uncertainty created by the Hale to Schriever warranty deed not 
conforming to the prior uniform real estate contract under which Gildeas were purchasing 
at the time Sittner's lien attached, Sittner deemed it prudent to file the present action on 
August 3,1993, for declaratory relief and for the court to direct completion of the execution 
sale proceedings, joining Gildeas, Hale and Schriever who appeared to have an interest in 
the property and seeking a determination of their rights, interests and priorities. Sittner also 
included a "Count IF claim for fraudulent transfer declaratory relief in case Defendants 
claimed that Gildea had lost his ownership in the property by contract foreclosure or 
forfeiture [Complaint, Rec. 1-17; copy Appdx. 1]. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Under federal law, a debtor's bankruptcy discharge does not void a judgment 
lien attached to a debtor's real property but only extinguishes one mode of enforcing the 
judgment, namely personal liability of the debtor, leaving intact another mode the right to 
enforce the judgment in rem against the property. Thus generally liens that are not 
affirmatively avoided during a bankruptcy case pass through and are unaffected and remain 
enforceable. Continued enforcement of a judgment lien depends upon state law and under 
the Utah Judgment Act the judgment continues for eight years unless earlier satisfied by 
payment. A Utah judgment is not dependent upon the continuation of personal liability of 
the debtor for enforcement so the judgment is not voided or rendered unenforceable by a 
debtor's discharge, since the judgment lien stays with the property to which it is attached and 
may be enforced after transfer to a third party by execution to collect the judgment debt. 
B.( 1) Under the Bankruptcy Code a judgment lien is a property interest that does not 
become property of the estate and cannot be avoided except under a power conferred by the 
Bankruptcy Code and then only by affirmative relief in the case. Since no order voided 
Sittner's judgment lien, it was not extinguished in the bankruptcy. 
(2) The Bankruptcy Code classifies claims as "secured^ or "unsecured^ based 
upon the value of the collateral securing the claim. So a creditor's claim can be unsecured 
though he has a security interest with little or no value and he can participate fully in 
distributions to unsecured claims and still retain his lien interest. 
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(3) When property of the bankruptcy estate is abandoned either by the trustee or 
by the Bankruptcy Code upon case closing, the property stands as if no bankruptcy petition 
had been filed and is encumbered by the liens attached prepetition which remain enforceable 
on the property. 
(4) Under the Bankruptcy Code the trustee is empowered to avoid preferential 
transfers like judgment liens taken within ninety days of the petition, but only for property 
of benefit to the estate. The trustee filed an action to avoid Sittner's judgment lien, and by 
settlement stipulation the parties signed, Sittner agreed the lien was waived on property to 
be administered for the benefit of the estate while preserving the lien right on property later 
abandoned. The stipulation approved by court order had the effect of fully preserving 
Sittner's judgment lien on property abandoned by the estate back to the debtor. 
C. Ordinarily a Utah judgment lien only continues for a period of eight years, but 
under Bankruptcy Code § 108(c), the limitation period on state judgments is suspended 
during the period enforcement is prevented by §362(a), bankruptcy stay. Under the Utah 
judgment statute, the limitation period is suspended during the time enforcement is stayed 
in accordance with law, which also has the effect of tolling the life of the judgment while 
enforcement is prevented by the bankruptcy stay. Gildea's bankruptcy tolled Sittner's 
judgment for more than six years. Under Utah case law if enforcement of a judgment is 
restrained by a court or is prevented as a practical matter by the assertion of adverse claims 
in a judicial proceeding that could defeat the judgment lien, then there is equitable tolling of 
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the judgment limitation period during the period enforcement is restrained or prevented, 
including appeal of an adverse judgment. 
D. An award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 must be based 
on specific findings that the claims were unmeritorious meaning frivolous or without support 
in fact or law; and subjective bad faith. An action under the Utah Declaratory Judgments 
Act, which by statute is declared to be remedial, to settle controversies and is not open to 
objection; cannot support a finding of bad faith by merely commencing the action for to do 
otherwise would be repugnant to the legislative intent. The trial court failed to make a 
finding of subjective bad faith, instead merely stated a conclusion with no demonstration of 
the factual basis to support the conclusion, which is inadequate to establish bad faith. Nor 
is there any basis in law or fact for concluding that Sittner's declaratory action was 
unmeritorious. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees. 
E. The opinions of other judges are not admissible on a motion for summary 
judgment when they are not being offered or considered for issue preclusion or law of the 
case. It is an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit such opinions in evidence or to 
consider them for purposes of a summary judgment. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY EXTINGUISHES ONLY THE 
DEBTOR'S PERSONAL LIABILITY, BUT NOT THE JUDGMENT 
DEBT AND LIEN WHICH MA Y STILL BE ENFORCED IN REM 
AGAINST THE LIEN PROPERTY. 
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"Under U.C.A., 1953, 78-22-1, a judgment automatically becomes a lien upon all 
nonexempt real property of the judgment debtor at the time it is docketed. " Capital Assets 
Financial Services v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9,994 P.2d 201,206 (Utah 2000), quoting Taylor 
Nat% Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150,155 (Utah 1982). A judgment lien 
attaches to a vendee's beneficial ownership interest under a uniform real estate contract. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254, 1256 (Utah 1987). In this case, Sittner's 
judgment against Bruce Gildea was docketed on November 25,1995, in the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County and automatically attached as a valid perfected lien on Gildea's 
one-half ownership interest in the subject property. This is not disputed by Defendants. 
Gildea's discharge order necessarily reflects the language of 77 U.S.C. § 524, "Effect 
of Discharge", which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) A discharge in a case under this title— 
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such 
judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with 
respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944,1141,1228, or 1328 of 
this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived; 
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation 
of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset 
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor whether or not discharge 
of such debt is waived;... [Emphasis Added]. 
Under the plain language of 77 U.S.C. § 524, a bankruptcy discharge only voids a 
judgment to the extent it is a determination of personal liability of the debtor and only enjoins 
the commencement or continuation of an action that seeks to collect or recover a discharged 
"debt as a personal liability of the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C § 101(12), 
defines "debt" as "liability on a claim", and a discharge extinguishes the debtor's liability. 
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In contrast, 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) defines "lien" as a property interest and it is well 
settled that a discharge does not void liens which generally survive bankruptcy, nor prohibit 
lien enforcement by foreclosure or otherwise after case closing. Johnson v. Home State 
Bank 501 U.S. 78,115 L.Ed.2d 66,111 S.Ct. 2150 (1991), holding that a bankruptcy claim 
secured by a lien on real property has two components, an in rem component and an in 
personam component, and the discharge extinguishes only the in personam mode of 
enforcing a claim, while leaving intact the other — namely an action against the debtor in 
rem. 115 LJEd.2d at 74,75. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773,116 L.Ed.2d 
903 (1992), holding that Congress did not intend to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens 
pass through bankruptcy unaffected, nor can liens be stripped off the property to benefit the 
discharged debtor, stating, "We think, however, that the creditor's lien stays with the real 
property until the foreclosure. " 115 L.Ed.2d at 911,112 S. Ct. at 778. See also Owen v. 
Owen, 500 U.S. 305,114 L.Ed.2d 350,111 S.Ct. 1833 (1991); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 
U.S. 291,114L.Ed.2d337,11 S.Ct 1825 (1991); In re Sanders, 39 F.3d 258,260 (10th Cir. 
1994) ("Secured debts, including judgment liens . . . generally survive bankruptcy. "); 
Chandler Bank of Lions v. Ray, 804 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1986), bank's post-discharge and 
case closing action naming the debtor to obtain replevin of its collateral and related relief was 
an in rem action, and such actions by secured creditors are not precluded under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 524; and see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy \524.02 (15th ed. Rel./1995), state court actions 
joining a discharged debtor for the purpose of in rem enforcement of a creditor's lien are not 
prohibited by nor a violation of the discharge injunction. 
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Clearly then under federal bankruptcy law a discharge does not void or render 
unenforceable a prepetition judgment lien on a debtor's property, so it remains to be 
determined if Utah law on judgment liens would change the result. See Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 
754 R2d 938,940 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring), stating that federal law would 
have permitted the survival of a lien on the debtor's property despite the bankruptcy 
discharge, but noting that the continued existence of the lien was a question of state law. But 
Justice Zimmerman opined, "Under Utah law, once a lien was in place, it continued through 
the bankruptcy proceeding and could have been executed upon at anytime until the end of 
its statutory eight-year life" Id. at 940. 
Cox however involved an action to renew a judgment for an additional eight-year life 
which the court held impermissible given the discharge of the debtor. The court reasoned 
that a renewal judgment attaches only from the date of the new judgment and does not relate 
back to the original judgment date or extend the prior lien, citing Free v. Farnsworth, 188 
P.2d 731 (Utah 1948), and since the renewal judgment under our judgment statute, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-22-1, creates a new lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor owned 
by him at the time or thereafter acquired during the existence of the lien, that given the effect 
of a bankruptcy discharge of liability of a debtor that a judgment could not be renewed. Cox 
at 939. Of course Sittner did not seek to renew his judgment lien, but only to enforce it 
against specific property to which it had attached pre-bankruptcy petition. Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Cox is support for the continued enforceability of a Utah 
judgment despite the extinguishment of personal liability of the debtor. 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(J) provides, "Judgments shall continue for eight years 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance 
with law" Since it has already been established that a bankruptcy discharge does not stay 
enforcement of a judgment in rem, there is no express restriction in the statute that would 
prevent a judgment from continuing despite the extinguishment of personal liability of the 
debtor, unless the judgment is satisfied. The term "satisfied** with reference to a debt is 
commonly understood to mean "payment", not termination without payment. This is 
consistent with the use of the term in Utah R. Civ. P. 58B "Satisfaction of Judgment", which 
refers in subpart (b) to being "fully paid*'. Discharge of personal liability is certainly not 
satisfaction then and since Sittner's judgment lien was not satisfied and there is no other 
statutory restriction, the judgment lien continues. 
Also, when a Utah judgment lien is attached to property owned by a debtor, the lien 
remains attached and enforceable even after the debtor sells and conveys the property to 
another. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1258 (Utah 1987), once a judgment lien 
attached to the vendees interest, it continues to be a lien and is not destroyed or impaired by 
a vendee's sale or transfer of his interest to a third person, since the judgment debt and lien 
follow the property; Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec Bank, 723 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986). 
Thus continuation of the judgment and enforceability of the lien on property to which it 
attached is not dependent upon collection from the judgment debtor personally, which is 
consistent with secured debts generally. Therefore Utah judgments are not dependent upon 
continued personal liability of a debtor for lien enforcement and a discharge would not alter 
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the result. This view of the continued enforceability of Utah judgments after a bankruptcy 
discharge harmonizes them with the result reached by a majority of states on post-bankruptcy 
enforceability of their judgments. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d "Judgments" §297. 
Accordingly, Sittner's judgment lien survived Gildea's bankruptcy discharge and 
remained enforceable against the property and Sittner was not barred by the discharge from 
bringing this action to determine the validity and priority of his judgment lien and for the 
court to direct execution sale proceedings on the subject property. 
B. A JUDGMENT LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY OF A DEBTOR ISA 
PROPERTY INTEREST THAT CAN ONLY BE AVOIDED BY 
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AUTHORIZED BY THE BANKRUPTCY 
CODE AND SITTNER'S JUDGMENT LIEN WAS NOT WAIVED 
OR AVOIDED, BUT WAS EXPRESSLY PRESERVED. 
When Judge Wilkinson granted Defendants' third motion for summary judgment, 
Sittner's attorney asked him the basis for the ruling, and he answered that he made a 
determination on the merits that Sittner's judgment was waived in the prior bankruptcy case, 
although he articulated no reasons for such holding [7r. p 4, Rec. 1248]. 
The judgment does not disclose the basis for the decision and unfortunately even the 
improper findings of fact or the conclusions of law offer little additional help. Conclusion 
No. 1 says that Sittner knew or should have known that his judgment lien was waived during 
Gildea's bankruptcy. This merely repeats the judge's statement without explaining the 
reasons for the decision. Conclusion No. 1 also states that Sittner stipulated to avoid the 
judgment lien in order to participate in the distribution to unsecured creditors. 
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Thus the conclusions of law suggest that Sittner's judgment lien was waived or 
avoided in the bankruptcy because he filed an unsecured claim, he entered into a settlement 
stipulation with the bankruptcy trustee agreeing he would have an unsecured claim for 
claims administration, though he expressly preserved his judgment on property abandoned 
by closing and because he received a distribution from the bankruptcy estate on his 
unsecured claim. 
Therefore these acts must provide the basis under federal bankruptcy law for the 
court's summary judgment ruling that Sittner waived his judgment lien in Gildea's 
bankruptcy case. The failure of the trial judge to have complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), 
which requires a brief written statement of the grounds for the summary judgment, unfairly 
burdens Sittner here. See Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 
800 (Utah 1992). Of course Sittner will endeavor to defend the claim that he waived his 
judgment lien, but this Court should recognize that generally waiver is an affirmative defense 
under Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P (not plead here), and it is Defendants' burden to establish the 
grounds, and since it was summary judgment to establish them as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts. Conder v. Hunt, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 105, 1 P.3d 558, 563. 
1. A judgment lien on a debtor's real property is a property interest that can 
only be avoided by a power conferred in the Bankruptcy Code. 
Upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, under 11 U.S.C. §541, only the interest 
a debtor has in real property is passed to and becomes property of the estate. A judgment lien 
that attached to a debtor's real property prior to the bankruptcy filing only passes to the estate 
the debtor's subordinate interest and the judicial lien remains valid and unaffected, unless the 
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lien is avoided during the bankruptcy case by a power conferred in the Bankruptcy Code. 
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991), "Only where the 
Code empowers the court to avoid liens or transfers can an interest originally not within the 
estate be passed to the estate, and subsequently (through the claim of an exemption) to the 
debtor" 111 S.Ct. at 1836. In Owen, the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and after 
case closing, moved to reopen to avoid a prepetition judgment lien remaining on the debtor's 
residence, under the authority of 77 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), which permits avoidance of a 
judgment lien if necessary to protect a debtor's homestead exemption. Id. at 1835. 
There is no dispute that Sittner's judgment became a lien on the subject property 
before Gildea's bankruptcy filing. Since the subject property was not sold or otherwise 
administered during the case, and Gildea used his full Utah homestead exemption on other 
property, and no bankruptcy court order avoided Sittner's lien, under Code §541 and Owen, 
Sittner's judgment lien was not even brought into the estate and thus survived and remained 
enforceable in rem after case closing. 
2. Sittner's proof of claim was accurate and under the Bankruptcy Code 
properly classified as "unsecured" and he was entitled to receive a 
distribution on his unsecured claim which did not waive or relinquish his 
judgment lien on property not sold to benefit of the estate 
Defendants argued to the trial court that the mere fact that Sittner filed a bankruptcy 
proof of claim as "unsecured" and received a distribution on his unsecured claim, was 
completely inconsistent with having or retaining a judgment lien security interest in any of 
the debtor's property and therefore works an estoppel or waiver of Sittner's judgment lien. 
Indeed Schriever asserted that Sittner had taken inconsistent positions and was barred by the 
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doctrine of judicial estoppel, citing Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980), et. al., 
stating that a party is bound by its judicial declarations and may not contradict them in a 
subsequent proceeding involving the same parties and issues. In other words Schriever 
argues Sittner cannot have an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy and assert a right to a 
secured claim or interest in the present action. 
This argument would have basic appeal if common parlance is used to define and 
distinguish between "secured' and "unsecured' bankruptcy claims. It seems reasonable that 
if you are unsecured that you have no security and if you are secured, then you must have 
some security, so viewed in this respect the terms may seem mutually exclusive. 
However, the Bankruptcy Code classifies claims based on the value of the collateral 
securing the claim. 11 U.S.C §506(d) classifies a claim for all purposes under the Code as 
"secured' only to the extent of the value of the property interest subject to the lien securing 
the claim, and as "unsecured' to the extent that the creditor's claim is greater than such value. 
This means that a debt can be secured by a lien and if the creditor's lien interest in the 
property has no recoverable value, then the claim is "unsecured' by Code definition and 
classification, even though it is secured by a lien. It also means that a single claim may be 
both "secured' and "unsecured' depending on the value of the collateral securing it. See In 
re Harrison, 987 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1993), saying: 
Subsection (a) of §506 provides that a claim is secured only to the extent of the 
value of the property on which the lien is fixed; the remainder of that claim is 
considered unsecured. Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart {In re Hart), 923 F.2d 
1410,1413 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
489 U.S. 235,238-39, 109 S. Ct 1026,103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). 
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Under 11 U.S.C. §501 (a) a creditor "may" file a proof of claim, but under B.R. 
3002(a) an unsecured creditor must file a proof of claim if the creditor is to receive a 
distribution from a Chapter 7 estate. Under Code §502(a) a proof of claim is deemed 
allowed absent an objection by a party in interest. Code §502(b) makes provision for 
objections to claims, but does not authorize avoidance of liens, even if claims are disallowed. 
Sittner filed a proof of claim on the standard bankruptcy form in May, 1986 (copy 
Appdx. 7 )} Because Sittner believed that there was no recoverable value to satisfy his 
judgment on Gildea's real property, he marked the unsecured claim box. With respect to the 
subject property, Sittner's belief that there was no recoverable value after allowing for the 
senior encumbrance, was consistent with debtor's schedules and opinion of value and the 
bankruptcy's trustee's stated intention to abandon the subject property. 
In any event Sittner's proof of claim was completely accurate, not at all misleading 
and under the Bankruptcy Code classification of claims for administration, he was fully 
entitled to participate in estate distributions on unsecured claims, while retaining his 
judgment lien on the subject property which had no recoverable value at the time. 
1
 Sittner's claim in f2 sets forth the principal amount of the judgment, the interest 
accrued to date and the judgment execution costs incurred in proceedings just prior to the 
bankruptcy. In %3 of the claim reference is made to the Judgment as the reason the debtor 
owes the money and a copy of the Judgment was appended, as requested in f 4 of the form. 
Paragraph 5 of the form provides, " . . . the only security interest (collateral) held for this 
claim is:" and in the blank the term "Judgment" is inserted. In^ [6 of the claim form, Sittner 
placed an "X' in the box for "unsecured" The form provides in <|6 by a footnote to the 
"secured' box, "the claim is unsecured except to the extent that the security interest has 
value sufficient to satisfy it. " 
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Clearly then there is no judicial estoppel because the position Sittner took in the 
bankruptcy case with respect to the lien property and in this case are not inconsistent and 
certainly nothing in the record of this case suggests that his opinion that there was no 
recoverable value at the time he filed his bankruptcy claim was incorrect or inaccurate. In 
any event judicial estoppel does not apply except when a party knowingly makes a 
misrepresentation under oath or attempts to commit a fraud on the court by taking an 
inconsistent position from a prior case. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 
P.2d 731,734 (Utah 1995). Moreover Sittner has never been asked in this proceeding what 
his opinion of the value of Gildea's property was at the time of the prior bankruptcy case, so 
he certainly has not taken any position under oath or otherwise inconsistent with his view of 
the value in his bankruptcy claim. Also Gildea had better access to information on the value 
of his property than Sittner did and this defeats judicial estoppel as well. Id. at 734. 
3. Property abandoned from the estate is treated as if no bankruptcy case had 
been filed and remains subject to the liens attached before filing. 
Under 11 UXC. §554(a), the bankruptcy trustee after notice and hearing is permitted 
to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome or of inconsequential value and 
benefit to the estate. Section 554(c) provides, "Unless the court orders otherwise, any 
property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time 
of closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor...". 
It is undisputed that the subject property was a scheduled asset in Gildea's bankruptcy, 
and although the trustee had expressed his intention to abandon the property before case 
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closing, since it had not been abandoned or sold or otherwise administered for the benefit of 
the estate by closing, it was abandoned to Gildea upon case closing under §554(c). 
When property is abandoned from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to Code §554 it 
ceases to be property of the estate and stands as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed and 
is subject to the liens that encumbered it prior to the bankruptcy filing. Dewsnup v. Timm 
{In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676 (Bkrtcy D. Utah 1988); affirmed 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 
1990); affirmed 502 U.S. 410,112 S.Ct. 773,116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992). 
In Dewsnup, the Chapter 7 debtors' real property encumbered by a Utah trust deed 
was abandoned by the trustee under Code §554 and the debtors brought an adversary 
proceeding seeking to value the collateral pursuant to Code §506(a) to bifurcate the creditors 
claim into a secured portion equal to the value of the collateral and an unsecured portion for 
the excess and to then strip down the creditors lien under Code §506(d), so that debtor's 
could retain the property by merely paying the secured portion. The court held that property 
abandoned from the estate is returned to its pre-filing status respecting liens as though no 
bankruptcy case had been filed and §506(d) only applied if property is sold or administered 
to benefit the estate. Dewsnup, 87 B.R at 683. This result was affirmed by the 10th Circuit, 
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 590, 591. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in affirming did so on broader grounds saying, ". . . no 
provision of the pre-Code statute permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a 
creditors lien for any reason other than payment on the debt." Dewsnup, 116 L.Ed.2d at 
912. Congress enacted the Code with a full understanding of this practice and intended that 
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it continue. Id. at 912. The Court said that the creditor's lien stays with the real property 
until foreclosure and that this way any increase in value rightly accrues to the benefit of the 
creditor and not to the benefit of the debtor or other unsecured creditors. Id. at 911. 
The Supreme Court in Dewsnup also considered the debtor's argument that failure to 
avoid or strip down the lien unfairly allowed the creditor to retain a security interest in real 
property and to participate fully in liquidation dividends as an unsecured creditor. In 
rejecting this argument the Court said: 
It is true that his participation in the bankruptcy results in his having the 
benefit of an allowed unsecured claim as well as his allowed secured claim, but 
that does not strike us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by 
way of elimination of the remainder of the lien. Dewsnup, 116 L.Ed.2d at 911. 
While Dewsnup dealt with a Utah trust deed lien rather than a judgment lien, no 
distinction on the type of lien was made in the court's opinion and the rationale does not 
appear susceptible to any different treatment or result for a judicial lien. See In re Sanders, 
93 F.3d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1994), bankruptcy protection does not permit a debtor to avoid 
a Utah judgment lien attached prepetition to property, since post-discharge and case closing 
appreciation in the property or even retirement of principal will remain subject to the lien and 
will enure to the benefit of the judgment lienholder, not debtor. 
4. Sittner's judgment lien was expressly preserved by a stipulation made with the 
bankruptcy trustee approved by an order of the court and any attack based 
on claims administration is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
In June 1989, Gildea's bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary complaint seeking to 
avoid Sittner's judgment lien as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. §547 made within 
ninety days of the bankruptcy petition; that enables such creditor to receive more than the 
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creditor would receive under a Chapter 7 case. The trustee must prove all elements of 
§547 (b), including that the creditor would benefit financially over the amount the creditor 
would receive as a dividend from the Chapter 7 estate if the transfer is not avoided. In re 
Meridith Hoffman Partners, 12F.3d 1549, 1556 (10th Cir. 1993). Therefore if avoiding 
a judgment lien taken on property, would result in the property having no benefit or value to 
the estate for liquidation purposes, then the requirement of §547(b)(5) has not been met and 
the trustee can't avoid the transfer. Indeed the trustee's lien avoidance power under §547 may 
not be asserted to generally avoid the affect of a judicial lien, but may only be asserted to 
avoid the lien in connection with the sale of properties beneficial to the estate. Ernst v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 26 B.R. 959 (Bkrtcy S.D. Ohio, 1983). 
Sittner's judgment was entered within ninety days of Gildea's bankruptcy petition and 
the creation of the judgment lien would constitute a transfer the trustee would be entitled to 
avoid under §547, upon any real property that would be of benefit to the estate. Therefore, 
Sittner and the trustee entered into a settlement "Stipulation" [copy Appdx. 8], which 
provided the following: 
1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives any right to assert a 
secured claim in and to any property of this estate or any funds which 
constitute proceeds of property of this estate and acknowledges that any and 
all claim he has is an unsecured, prepetition claim. Defendant's rights 
respecting property abandoned by the estate or not administered by 
closing are preserved and unaffected hereby. [Emphasis added]. 
2. This case will be dismissed with prejudice after Court approval 
of the Stipulation. 
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The trustee obtained court approval and an order dismissing the adversary proceeding with 
prejudice under the terms of the Stipulation. 
Despite the contrary contentions of Defendants, the Stipulation is not ambiguous, it 
quite clearly waives Sittner's judgment lien against any property or proceeds of property of 
benefit to the estate, but preserves and leaves unaffected his judgment lien attached to 
property of no benefit to the estate and either abandoned from the estate or not administered 
by closing. The trustee had expressed an intention to abandon the subject property from the 
estate, and indeed this occurred upon case closing and the Stipulation and order of dismissal 
with prejudice operated directly to preserve Sittner's judgment lien on such property. 
The bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §323 (a). It is the 
trustees duty where a purpose would be served to examine proofs of claim and to object to 
the allowance of any claim that is improper. 11 U.S.C. §704(5). Therefore in the trustee's 
representative capacity for the estate, the trustee is the primary objecting and adverse party 
and other creditors and the debtor are not generally entitled to object to claims in the 
administration process. In rePadget, 119 B.R. 793 (Bkrtcy D. Colo. 1990). In re Werth, 
54 B.R. 619 (Bkrtcy D. Colo. 1985). The debtor has privity with the trustee on claims 
administration. 
A settlement stipulation resulting in a consent decree or in dismissal with prejudice 
under the terms of a stipulation, as was done here, bars re-litigation of all grounds for or 
defenses to recovery between the parties or their privies on all issues that were or reasonably 
should have been litigated in connection with the matter, under the doctrine of res judicata. 
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Brawn v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127,60 L.Ed.2d 767,99 S.Ct. 2205 (1979). Therefore under the 
principles of res judicata, Sittner's Judgment lien can't be assailed by Gildea, it was 
unequivocally preserved and unaffected by case administration and survived and was capable 
of enforcement in rem following Gildea's bankruptcy closing. 
In addition under common law principles, waiver is the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right, claim or privilege and the intent to relinquish must be 
distinct and manifest. 28 Am. Jur. 2d (<Estoppel and Waiver9' §158 (1995). Certainly the 
Stipulation demonstrates that Sittner had no intention of waiving his Judgment lien on 
property abandoned subject to his lien. 
C. SITTNER'S JUDGMENT LIEN AND EXECUTION 
PROCEEDINGS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
The Utah judgment statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(1) provides: "Judgments shall 
continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment 
is stayed in accordance with law." 
Therefore the judgment against Gildea entered and docketed November 25, 1985, 
ordinarily would have expired eight years later upon November 25, 1993. Sittner 
commenced this action on August 3, 1993, more than a few months prior to the expiration 
of the eight year period without regard to any tolling or suspension of the limitation period 
caused by the lengthy duration of Gildea's bankruptcy. 
Sittner could have completed execution sale proceedings within the time period 
remaining. But given the uncertainty created by the length of Gildea's bankruptcy, the chain 
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of title appearance of a deed to a party, Schriever, that had not previously been in the chain, 
without any exception for or reference to Gildea's contract ownership, it was prudent and 
reasonable for Sittner to resort to the court to seek declaratory relief to determine the validity 
of the judgment and the rights and priorities of the parties and to control or direct the 
completion of execution proceedings, rather than boldly executing and risking interference 
with the title or possessory rights of potentially bona fide purchasers. 
So Sittner commenced this action and immediately Defendants asserted the invalidity 
and unenforceability of his judgment against the property. Early on Defendants obtained a 
ruling defeating Sittner's judgment and subsequently after the trial judge's reversal obtained 
another ruling defeating his title and ultimately obtained a final judgment defeating his 
judgment lien in March of 1997. But this time at their urging, the trial court included a 
decision that the statute of limitations had expired. 
Indeed the judgment signed by the court on March 25, 1997, states in %2 that 
"Plaintiffs complaint against all named Defendants herein is barred by the statutes of 
limitations ". But this is plainly incorrect, because the complaint was filed more than three 
and one-half months before the end of the normal eight year limitation period. Nevertheless 
Sittner must defend the statute of limitations and fortunately both federal and state law 
suspend the running of the eight year limitation period during the time enforcement of the 
judgment was stayed and prevented by Gildea's bankruptcy filing. 
1. Federal law tolls the running of the state limitation period on a judgment 
during the time the debtor's bankruptcy protection prevents enforcement of 
thejudgment 
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In this case, Sittner caused execution proceedings to be issued shortly after the 
judgment was entered. The sheriff had completed service of the writ, recording of the notice 
of levy on the subject property and a sale date was pending, when on January 16, 1986, 
Gildea filed for bankruptcy protection. His filing triggered the automatic stay provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §362(a), which enjoins and prevents, "(2) the enforcement 
against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the 
commencement of the case" and "(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against 
property of the estate". 
Unless the bankruptcy court grants specific relief from the stay, 11 U.S.C. §3 62 (c)(1) 
provides that the stay of an act against property of the estate continues until such property is 
no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §541 defines property of the estate very broadly 
to include any legal or equitable interest the debtor has in property at the commencement of 
the case. Clearly then Gildea's interest in the subject property became property of the estate 
upon his bankruptcy filing and Sittner's execution proceedings were enjoined and stayed by 
the statutory injunction and no further enforcement of Sittner's judgment lien could be taken 
until the subject property was no longer part of the bankruptcy estate. 
Gildea's bankruptcy case continued for more than six years to the date of closing in 
April of 1992, and at no time prior thereto was any relief from the automatic stay granted to 
Sittner, nor was the subject property abandoned from the bankruptcy estate by the bankruptcy 
trustee. Under 11 U.S.C. §554(c), any property scheduled in the bankruptcy case that is not 
otherwise administered at the time of closing is by operation of this subsection then 
31 
abandoned to the debtor. So the subject property was deemed abandoned to Gildea upon 
closing in April of 1992, which then terminated the stay since the property was only then no 
longer property of the estate. 
If the eight year limitation period on Sittnefs judgment continued to run during the 
bankruptcy case, then Sittner would be unfairly prejudiced having lost the right to enforce 
the judgement during the six year automatic stay period. Fortunately Congress did not intend 
such prejudice to occur and provided in 77 U.S.C. §108 for a suspension of state limitation 
periods during the time the automatic stay is in effect. Section 108(c) provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy 
law,... fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court 
other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor,... and such period 
has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period 
does not expire until the later of— 
(l)the end of such period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or 
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay 
under section 362,... of this title,... [Emphasis added]. 
77 U.S.C, § 108(c) is applicable to suspend the running of state judgment lien periods 
during the period that the bankruptcy stay prevents enforcement of a judgment lien. In Re 
Morton, 866 F.2d 561 (2nd Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit in Morton framed the issue and 
its holding as follows: 
This appeal presents a question we first answered over fifty years ago, 
but which, because of our subsequent holdings and congress's amendment of 
the bankruptcy code, requires further attention today: Does a judgment lien, 
normally valid under New York law for a period of ten years, remain 
32 
enforceable after expiration of the ten-year period when during that period the 
property subject to the lien becomes part of a bankrupt estate protected by the 
automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C §362(a)? 
. . . We hold that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) tolls New York's ten-year period 
limiting judgment liens on real property until the automatic stay is terminated. 
Accordingly, we affirm. Id at 561, 562. 
In accord with In re Morton that Bankruptcy Code § 108(c) tolls the period for 
enforcement of a statutory lien during the period that enforcement is prevented by the 
bankruptcy stay, Miner Corp. v. Hunters Run Ltd Partnership, 875 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 
1989); In re Miller, 133 B.R. 405 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1991); In re APC Const, Inc., 112 
B.R. 89 (Bkrtcy. D. Vt. 1990); Matter of Burger, 125 B.R. 894 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 1991); 
Major Lumber Co. v. G & B Remodeling, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App. 1991); Garbe 
Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester, 99111.2d 84,457 N.E.2d 422. 
Also in accord is Citicorp Mortgage Inc. v. Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992), 
holding that Utah's three month limitation period on a trust deed deficiency action was tolled 
during the automatic stay in bankruptcy, saying: 
Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in plain unequivocal 
language that a period of time fixed for commencing or continuing a civil 
action unrelated to the bankruptcy proceeding "does not expire until the later 
of— (1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after 
notice for termination or expiration of the stay ..." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-1241 bears directly upon the issue presented, and 
its substance is wholly consistent with like provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
In similar plain and unequivocal language, the statute provides, "When the 
commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition the 
time of the continuance or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action." Thus, under both the Bankruptcy Code and 
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our OWE statute, plaintiffs deficiency action was timely filed. [Emphasis 
added] Id. at 557. 
Because federal law created the automatic stay preventing the enforcement of Sittner's 
Utah judgment lien, Congress saw fit to prevent the unfairness and inequity that would result 
from shortening the life of the judgment when bankruptcy suspended enforcement. So under 
Bankruptcy Code § 108(c), the limitation period was suspended for more than six years and 
such period is tacked on to the normal expiration date which would have been November of 
1993. Thus Sittner's judgment was enforceable until the end of 1999 by operation of federal 
law, well past the trial court's adverse ruling in March of 1997. 
2. The limitation period on a judgment is suspended by the Utah 
judgment statute during the period enforcement was prevented by the 
Gildea bankruptcy stay. 
As already pointed out, the Utah judgment statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(1), 
provides, "Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless 
enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law'' The concluding phrase is 
susceptible of no other meaning than the eight year period continues unless enforcement of 
the judgment is stayed, in which case the eight year period is tolled or suspended during the 
duration of a stay of enforcement. This interpretation is also consistent with the general 
statute of limitations tolling provision in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41: 
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a 
statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or the 
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
Defendants may argue that the meaning of §78-22-1(1), "judgment is stayed in 
accordance with law" refers only to Utah law and not to the bankruptcy automatic stay. This 
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is incorrect of course, the term "stayed in accordance with law", includes federal law as well 
as state law. In this regard, see APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670 (Utah App. 1996), holding that 
the tolling statute for statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41, which makes no 
reference to federal or state law, operated to toll and suspend the limitation period on 
foreclosure proceedings prevented by the bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. §362(a). 
Defendants acknowledged that this was the effect of the tolling language in the Utah 
judgment statute at oral arguments before the trial court on Schriever's third motion for 
summary judgment [See Tr. 1644, p. 22-23]. But they argued strenuously and convinced the 
trial judge that the bankruptcy stay under Code §362 is only in effect in a Chapter 7 case until 
the debtor is discharged, and since Gildea was discharged in December of 1987, they 
asserted that there was only two years of tolling and the statute of limitations had still 
expired. [Rec. Tr. 1644, p. 23-24]. See also Finding of Fact ^ [16 which states that the eight 
year statutory period for foreclosing Sittner's judgment lien has expired notwithstanding any 
tolling periods that could have been caused by Gildea's bankruptcy. However this is plainly 
wrong since 11 U.S.C §362(c) provides in pertinent part, "(1) the stay of an act against 
property of the estate under subsection (a) continues until such property is no longer 
property of the estate;". Under subsection (2), the stay of any other act continues until the 
earliest of case closing; case dismissal; or in a case under Chapter 7 the time discharge is 
granted to the debtor. 
In this case Sittner would be seeking to enforce his judgment lien by execution or 
foreclosure and that would clearly be against property of the estate and there is no doubt that 
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the statutory injunction then continued until the subject property was no longer property of 
the estate. Therefore, Sittner's analysis and argument was correct before the trial court as 
it is in this Brief, that the bankruptcy injunction tolled the limitation period on his judgment 
lien for more than six years. So there was more than two years remaining on the enforcement 
period when the trial court granted its summary judgment of dismissal with prejudice and 
extinguished any possibility of enforcement by its adverse decision which is now on appeal. 
3. The Utah judgment limitation period is also tolled during a period 
when the lienholder is required to defend his title against adverse 
claims, thereby preventing enforcement or during the appeal of an 
adverse ruling defeating his title. 
In this case Defendants could still assert the bar of the statute of limitations on 
Sittner's judgment despite the tolling of the limitation period for more than six years by 
Gildea's bankruptcy, because even with such tolling the period expired at approximately the 
end of 1999, and Sittner has been appealing the trial court's adverse decision extinguishing 
his judgment and lien since 1997. It would be a most absurd result, if all Defendants had to 
do to prevail was to assert the invalidity of Sittner's judgment lien from the outset of this 
action which was commenced months before the expiration of the original eight year 
limitation period, and then remain steadfast in their assertion of defenses to enforcement of 
the judgment lien and to run over to the bankruptcy court and seek relief there if they get an 
adverse ruling in the state court until finally the statute of limitations expires. Then they need 
only assert the bar of the statute to prevail, thus taking the matter out of the hands of the court 
and undermining the judicial process. This would be a most odious result and one that is not 
sanctioned under Utah law. 
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The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Capital Asset Financial Services v. Maxwell, 
2000 UT 9,994 P.2d 201,204, that once a judgment lien attaches, a judgment creditor may 
levy execution on the property or foreclose on the lien if called upon to defend against an 
action to cancel the lien interest, citing Free v. Farnsworth, 112 UT 410, 188 P.2d 731 
(1948). 
In Free the judgment creditor was sued in a quiet title action (an action seeking 
declaratory relief similar to the action involved in the case at bar) and by practical necessity 
was required to defend the validity of the judgment in the action. The court said: 
Respondent corporation deemed it unsafe to proceed with a levy of 
execution while the judgment debtor's title was being defeated, and sought to 
have the court control the sale of the property after determining the priority of 
liens. 
Id at 733. In response to the argument that the suit was not a foreclosure action by the 
judgment creditor and that no restraining order or injunction prevented the creditor from 
levying execution during the pendency of the quiet title action, the Free court said that the 
practical effect was the same as an injunction. Id at 734. The court held that this was 
equivalent to the judgment debtor preventing a levy of execution or sale of the property by 
injunction proceedings, so the creditor was entitled to the same period of time before 
expiration of the judgment as would have been permitted had the time period for enforcement 
not been lost. Id at 735. 
To the same effect is Moution v. Morgan, 202 P.2d 723 (Utah 1949) which held that 
the judgment lien period was suspended by reason of the issuance of a restraining order 
preventing execution upon the judgment that lasted for a number of years. See also Belnap 
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v. Blain, 575 P.2d 656 (Utah 1978), holding that ordinarily execution proceedings on a 
judgment is the proper way of enforcement, but that the equitable powers of the court to 
foreclose on a judgment lien may be invoked when the judgment debtor has transferred the 
property and it is possible that adverse claims to the judgment may be asserted, then the court 
can control the sale of the property after determining the priority of the liens. Id at 700. 
Free and Moulton establish under Utah law that when execution or enforcement 
proceedings on a judgment are restrained or prevented by the successful assertion of adverse 
defenses then equitable tolling will extend the duration of the judgment lien until the 
infirmity or injunction is terminated. Under Free Sittner could not be expected to simply 
issue out execution proceedings in view of the uncertainty created by the transfer to 
Schriever and Gildea's long prior bankruptcy. Accordingly Sittner enlisted the equitable 
powers of the court for a declaration and determination of the validity of his judgment lien 
and for determination of the rights and priorities of the other parties and his judgment lien 
cannot now be defeated by Defendants obtaining an adverse ruling and hanging onto the 
adverse ruling until Sittner's judgment lien fully expires and is no longer enforceable. 
Under Free there is equitable tolling of the limitation period which would be 
applicable here, particularly given the series of adverse rulings and the duration involved in 
the trial court proceedings. Sittner should not be prejudiced by the delay in the appeal 
process or the delay that was caused before the trial court and the limitation period should 
be suspended in accordance with Free throughout the course of the proceedings both in the 
trial court and on appeal. 
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D. THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT TO SUPPORT AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-27-56. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 provides that in civil actions the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. It is under this statute 
that Defendants' claim a right to an award of attorney's fees because Sittner didn't ultimately 
prevail after repeated cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court first interpreted the statute in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149 (Utah 1983), and held that the statute was intended to be narrowly drawn and was not 
meant to apply to all prevailing parties in civil suits. To safeguard against improper 
application, two elements had to be established in addition to being the prevailing party. First 
the claim must be "without merif which the court equated with "frivolous" or "having no 
basis in law or fact" Id at p. 151. The second element that the action was not in "good 
faith" requires that the trial court find conduct that is lacking in good faith. Thus the trial 
court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (1) the party lacked an 
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) the party intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to, or acted with the knowledge 
that the activities in question would hinder, delay or defraud others. Id at p. 151. In 
addition, the bad faith finding must be supported by sufficient evidence that one or more of 
these factors existed. Id at 152. 
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In Cody, the trial court found a lack of good faith because plaintiffs failed to research 
the legal issues as instructed at pretrial conference and had they done so they would have 
discovered that no valid claim existed which caused the other parties expense and the court 
a waste of valuable time. While the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's view that it 
was improvident and unmeritorious and ultimately a waste of time, the Court rejected the 
trial court's conclusion that their conduct rose to the level of a lack of good faith. The Court 
repeated, that the evidence must affirmatively establish a lack of good faith and that it is not 
sufficient for an award of attorney's fees to show merely that the parties or their attorney were 
foolish in their claims. Id. at 153. 
Even after the 1988 amendments to the statute which may have appeared to relax the 
standards required for awarding attorney's fees, the Supreme Court in Canyon Country Store 
v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), held that the statute was still to be narrowly construed 
and applied only occasionally, saying: 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by an 
insurer does not show the bad faith necessary for an award under section 78-
27-56. Notwithstanding the name given the covenant, breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is an objective question. As is true of virtually 
all other contractual breaches, the intention of the breaching party is 
immaterial. See Beck 701 P.2d at 800. On the other hand, the existence of bad 
faith, which must be shown under section 78-27-56, is a subjective question 
of state of mind. Footnote 6. Id. at p. 421. 
In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the court reversed 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees under the statute because specific findings are 
required on each element to show that the award of attorney's fees was based upon the two 
40 
prong standard of meritless claim and the subjective standard of bad faith and not simply 
because the recovering party prevailed. The court again cautioned: 
A party may bring a good faith action and not prevail. Failure of a 
cause of action or defense does not automatically require the losing party to 
pay costs. If we were to adopt such an approach, parties who had difficult but 
valid claims would be economically precluded from bringing suit. Id at p. 
1063. 
Before applying these standards to Sittner's case, it is most important to note that he 
commenced this action under the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-33-
7, et. seq., for declaratory relief. Specifically invoking Utah Code Ann. §78-33-2 (see 
Sittnefs Complaint f 18), which authorizes an action by any person interested under a deed, 
will, contract or whose rights, status or other legal relations may be affected to have 
determined in a Utah court of law any question of construction or validity. UCA §78-33-1 
states, "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the grounds that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for." UCA §78-33-11 provides that when 
declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest 
which would be affected by the declaration. UCA §78-33-12 specifically states: 
This Chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and 
other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered. 
Given the stated salutary purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, UCA §78-33-12, 
that such actions and the right to relief thereunder are remedial and are to "afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity" with respect to the rights and legal relations, it appears 
impossible to reconcile the intended statutory purpose with a finding of subjective bad faith 
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for utilizing the Act. Indeed assessing attorney's fees against a party for seeking declaratory 
relief under the Act completely thwarts the benefit and protection of affording relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity and makes it ring hollow in light of the imposition of a penalty. 
In like manner, what could the legislature have meant in adopting §78-33-1 that says no 
action shall be open to objection, if the opposing party can merely object and the court will 
impose a penalty in the form of assessment of the other parties' attorney's fees that are not 
otherwise provided by contract or statute. 
Sittner asserts that unless the trial court can point to some specific egregious conduct 
during the case engaged in by the party who brings the declaratory relief action that would 
justify an award of attorney's fees independent of bringing the action in the first place, that 
the Court should rule as a matter of law that a declaratory relief action in accordance with 
the Act cannot be equated with or give rise to either a finding of unmeritorious or subjective 
bad faith. Or stated differently, resort to declaratory relief should be equated with a 
demonstration that the party has an honest belief in the propriety of the action, doesn't intend 
to take unconscionable advantage of others and didn't intend to act to hinder, delay or 
defraud others as a matter of law. 
In any event in this case resolved on summary judgment, there is no specific finding 
of bad faith by the trial judge. The trial judge did adopt a conclusion of law, f4 that states, 
"Plaintiff claims are without merit and not asserted in good faith" This is just what it 
purports to be, a conclusion and not a finding and doesn't even suggest what conduct gave 
rise to the conclusion that the claims were not asserted in good faith. This does not meet the 
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standard for specific findings set forth in Wat/ass & Campbell, 808 P.2d at 1068. Moreover 
the trial judge was disposed to grant attorney's fee to Defendants each time they won, as 
indicated by the transcript of the hearings without any mention of or regard to a finding of 
bad faith. The only thing the trial judge mentioned was that he believed the action was 
frivolous or not well taken, which cannot be equated with the subjective finding of bad faith. 
In this case there is absolutely no evidentiary or legal basis for finding or concluding 
that Sittner lacked an honest belief that he had a valid judgment lien against specific real 
property that survived Gildea's long-term bankruptcy case and that he was entitled to have 
the priorities determined and join the necessary parties. 
Of course Defendants contend that Sittner's judgment lien did not survive bankruptcy 
and was no longer capable of supporting execution proceedings to enforce the lien, based on 
an arcane and largely undisclosed theory of waiver during the bankruptcy case. How could 
Sittner anticipate this defense, Defendants didn't even assert it affirmatively in their answers 
and he still doesn't understand it. Nonetheless, as pointed out in Argument, Sections "A" 
and "B" herein, Defendants' theories are contrary to the weight of existing legal authority. 
It might even be reasonable to assume that since the trial judge had such difficulty 
resolving the legal issues, having first granted summary judgment for Defendants, then 
subsequently after further briefing and more careful analysis having granted summary 
judgment in favor of Sittner, that this would demonstrate that the merits of Sittner's action 
were not "frivolous" or of so little weight or without any basis in law or fact, within the 
enunciated standard for "meritless" required for U.C.A. §78-27-56. 
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Moreover, Sittner did not rush out and execute upon his judgment lien or take any 
other action to directly interfere with the ownership or possession of Gildeas' or Schriever 
in her claim to be a contract seller. Instead he commenced an action for declaratory relief so 
that the court could make such determinations and protect the parties and afford the 
appropriate relief Indeed Sittner made an informed decision to choose an action for 
declaratory relief based upon the Supreme Court's admonitions in Baldwin v. Burton, 850 
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). 
In Baldwin the court had no difficulty affirming the trial court's determination that 
Burton's actions in executing upon property that was not owned by their judgment debtor, 
but instead was owned by a bona fide purchaser and they had notice of their interest before 
executing, was certainly unmeritorious and without legal basis. Further in response to 
Burton's claim that the Fraudulent Transfer Act permits them to execute and ask questions 
later, the court held that a fraudulent transfer should always be established by declaratory 
relief before executing or otherwise attempting to interfere with a transferee. But the court 
affirmed the finding that Burton had a lack of good faith only because the execution praecipe 
directed to the sheriff did not seek to levy merely upon the interest of the judgment debtor, 
but instead named specifically the innocent purchasers of the property. The court concluded 
this was wrong and that defendants had sufficient notice in advance of their wrongful act so 
they demonstrated a lack of good faith. Id. at P.2d 1191. 
While Sittner based on the clear and persuasive weight of legal authority, still believes 
and maintains that his judgment and lien are valid and that execution proceedings would be 
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proper and be issued; nonetheless, Sittner chose the cautious and prudent method of 
commencing an action for declaratory relief as the Utah Supreme Court advised in Baldwin 
v. Burton. It therefore is totally nonsensical and absolutely repugnant to the policies set forth 
in the Declaratory Judgment Act and in Baldwin for the court to find or conclude that 
Sittner's action lacked good faith or was frivolous as necessary to support an award of 
attorney's fees under U.C.A. §78-27-56 for Defendants. Accordingly the trial court must 
be reversed on this issue. 
E. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN NOT 
GRANTINGSITTNER'S MOTION TO STRIKE OTHER JUDGES' 
OPINIONS AND IN CONSIDERING SUCH OPINIONS IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
After Gildea was successful in obtaining a bankruptcy order adverse to Sittner, 
Defendants were granted summary judgment on August 15, 1995 of dismissal and an award 
of attorney's fees. But this judgment was based upon the collateral estoppel/issue preclusion 
of the bankruptcy order and indeed the trial court acknowledged that this was so in its 
October 10,1995 order staying further proceedings pending appeal of the bankruptcy judge's 
decision, and providing that if the U.S. District Court reversed or vacated the order that the 
August 1995 summary judgment, findings and conclusions based thereon would be 
automatically vacated and further proceedings could ensue. (See Order, copy Appdx. 3). 
One of the four essential requirements of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion is a final 
adverse judgment on the issue to be precluded. Glen Core, Ltd v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376, 381 
(Utah 1998). Once the federal district judge reversed and vacated the bankruptcy order, there 
no longer was any adverse judgment that could create issue preclusion let alone a final 
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adverse judgment. Under the trial court's stay order, the effect of the reversal was for the 
August 1995 summary judgment to be automatically vacated and that left intact the 
September 7, 1994 summary judgment in Sittner's favor, that his judgment lien survived. 
Nonetheless, Schriever ignored this and in January of 1997, filed a third motion for 
summary judgment offering no new facts or legal analysis other than including the 
bankruptcy judge's ruling and the federal district judge's endorsement of the conclusions, 
and based thereon asserted Defendants' right to have the prior summary judgment reinstated 
[Rec. 1061-1126]. Gildeas' joined in the motion [Rec. 1141], and Sittner responded by 
objecting to the inclusion and consideration of the opinions and moved to strike them as 
improper and not permissible [Rec. 1154,1160,1166]. Sittner cited Harline v. Barker, 912 
P.2d 433, 440-42 (Utah 1996), holding that a trial court's consideration of a bankruptcy 
judge's ruling, even if treated as expert testimony, was improper inadmissible evidence that 
cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
The Harline court said even likening the bankruptcy judge's ruling to expert 
testimony and weighing the admissibility against the prejudicial effect raises ethical and 
public policy concerns and the ruling would have little if any probative value and is 
substantially outweighed by prejudice, and accordingly each of the trial court's involved 
abused their discretion in considering the ruling. Id at 441-442. See also Glen Core Ltd 
v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 1998), improper for the trial court to simply adopt the 
bankruptcy court's conclusions. 
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In this case the bankruptcy ruling and judge's endorsement were inadmissable as well. 
Moreover, including the opinions in Defendants' memoranda and the court's considering 
them was also improper under Rule 4-508 CJA, which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Unpublished opinions, orders and judgment have no precedential 
value and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for 
purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or 
collateral estoppel. 
Since the bankruptcy judge's ruling and opinion were reversed and vacated by the 
federal district judge, there was no collateral estoppel/issue preclusion applicable and the 
opinions were then merely unpublished opinions with no precedential value and improperly 
admitted and received and considered by the trial judge. The trial judge did not grant 
Sittner's motion to strike the offending opinions from the memoranda and did consider the 
bankruptcy judge's opinion. See Transcript oj Hearing [Rec. 1245-49, p. 4; copy in Appdx. 
5] where the judge says, "Of course I've read the bankruptcy judge ys decision and as I say 
that goes into the consideration...". [Tr. p. 4]. 
Based on Harline and Rule 4-508 C.J.A., the trial judge abused his discretion in 
considering the opinions which is err. However, such err may avail Sittner of nothing in 
view of this court's review of the merits of the summary judgment on this appeal for 
correctness as a matter of law. Still Sittner expects Defendants to again reproduce extensive 
portions of the bankruptcy ruling and federal district judge's gratuitous commentary and to 
include it in Appellees' brief in response hereto, and this would be improper and should not 
be tolerated and any attempt to do so should be stricken immediately. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's summary judgment and legal conclusions are erroneous and are not 
supported by the law and constitute err and must be reversed. Sittner's judgment and lien 
was not rendered unenforceable by Gildea's discharge and survived his bankruptcy case and 
was not waived by any action taken in the case, and it passed through the case and remained 
enforceable in rem against the subject property and it must be reinstated. The statute of 
limitations on Sittner's judgment was suspended during the period the bankruptcy stay in 
Giledea's case was in effect which was from the commencement of the case until the subject 
property was no longer a part of the estate, and that occurred on case closing in April of 
1992, and accordingly Sittner's judgment did not expire until the end of 1999, well after the 
trial judge's adverse decision. Accordingly the limitation period should be reinstated so that 
Sittner has the additional two years following the conclusion of this case to complete 
execution proceedings, and this Court should direct that equitable tolling applies until the 
completion of the case on remand. Costs should be awarded to Sittner. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of August, 2000. 
12 A:\Remand\Bhef.wpd 1275-03-01 (C003) 
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Appendix 1 
L. BENSON MABEY, P.C. (#A2035J- ' 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 :. 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
—r^-fs^^m-fl 
Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
JUDGE <73<??<3 < ^ 5 ~ TCy 
JUDGE HOMER F.WILKINSON 
Plaintiff through his undersigned counsel of record hereby 
alleges as follows: 
PARTIES AND SUBJECT MATTER 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Karen H. Schriever ("Schriever") is an 
individual believed to be residing in the State of Maryland and 
is joined in her capacity as trustee of the Karen H. Schriever 
Family Trust. 
3. Defendants Bruce Gildea and Shirlynn Gildea 
4 
(collectively "Gildeas") are husband and wife and are residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Joy Hale aka Joy Hale Horsley ("Hale") is 
an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. The subject matter of this action is a judgment lien 
against certain real property ("subject property") which is 
lying and situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah with a 
common address of 2400 East 3000 South and more particularly 
described in the Warranty Deed appended as Exhibit "A" hereto 
and incorporated herein. 
COUNT I 
(DECLARATORY RELIEF) 
6. On or about November 25, 1985, Plaintiff obtained a 
judgment against Defendant Bruce Gildea, et al. (the "Judgment") 
which was filed and docketed in the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah in Book 202, No. 1286 on November 26, 
1985 (copy of the Judgment is appended as Exhibit B hereto). 
7. On or about December 30, 1985, Plaintiff caused a 
Writ of Execution to be issued for collection of the unpaid 
balance of the Judgment and in furtherance of the execution 
proceedings the Salt Lake County Sheriff attached and levied 
upon the right, title and interest of Defendant Bruce Giidea in 
the subject property, by filing for record with the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder a Writ of Execution and Notice of 
Real Estate Levy (copy of Writ of Execution and Notice of Real 
2 
- ^ 
Estate Levy with recording information appended as Exhibit "C") . 
8. At the time the Judgment was docketed in Salt Lake 
County, Defendants Bruce Gildea and Shirlynn Gildea owned the 
subject property as joint tenants and were purchasing the 
subject property under the terms of a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract from Defendant Hale, as seller and fee title holder 
(copy of the "Notice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract" 
filed for record with the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 
20, 1981, appended as Exhibit "D"). 
9. Upon docketing, Plaintiff's Judgment lien attached to 
and became a valid and subsisting lien against the one-half 
ownership interest of Defendant Bruce Gildea in the subject 
property and execution was properly issued and levied upon the 
subject property by the Salt Lake County Sheriff, but such 
execution proceedings were suspended by the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah by Defendant Bruce Gildea on or about 
January of 1986. 
10• As part of the Bruce Gildea bankruptcy proceedings, 
Defendant Gildea elected to use his homestead exemption under 
Utah law and Defendant Gildea for this purpose selected real 
property other than the subject property to be exempt and 
therefore said Defendant may not claim a homestead exemption to 
defeat or diminish Plaintiff's Judgment lien. 
11. Defendant Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy case has now been 
3 
3 
closed and on or before closing Defendant Bruce Gildea's 
interest in the subject property was abandoned to him from the 
bankruptcy estate, subject to and burdened by Plaintiff's 
Judgment lien. 
12. From and after the date Plaintiff's Judgment lien 
attached to the subject property, Defendants Bruce Gildea and 
Shirlynn Gildea have been joint owners of the property each 
having a one-half undivided interest therein and they have been 
in possession continuously and remain in possession as of the 
date hereof. 
13. Plaintiff now desires to direct the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff to complete the execution proceedings that were 
commenced in 1985, but Plaintiff in taking steps in furtherance 
thereof discovered the existence of a Warranty Deed dated August 
3, 1992 (Exhibit "A" hereto) signed by Defendant Hale purporting 
to convey title to the subject property to Defendant Schriever. 
14. Plaintiff believes that Defendant Hale was directed 
by Gildeas, as owners of the subject property, to convey title 
to Defendant Schriever in satisfaction of Defendant Hale's 
obligation under the Uniform Real Estate Contract she made with 
the Gildeas. 
15. Plaintiff contends that a one-half undivided interest 
in the subject property was burdened by Plaintiff's Judgment 
lien at the time of the conveyance by Defendant Hale to 
Defendant Schriever and such one-half interest remains subject 
4 
4 
to Plaintiff's Judgment lien which is a first lien subordinate 
only to general real property taxes securing the unsatisfied 
Judgment amount due to Plaintiff in excess of $30,000.00 with 
interest accruing at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum. 
16. Plaintiff further contends that Plaintiff is entitled 
to direct the Salt Lake County Sheriff to proceed with and to 
complete execution proceedings and to cause the one-half 
interest in the subject property to be sold at execution sale to 
satisfy Plaintiff's Judgment together with all costs and 
expenses thereof and additional attorney's fees necessitated 
thereby and by this action, the same being added to and 
augmenting the unpaid Judgement balance. 
17. Defendant Hale, having conveyed title to the subject 
property with warranties, and Defendant Schriever, being the 
grantee under the purported Warranty Deed, may dispute 
Plaintiff's title, rights or claims under the Judgment lien or 
the Gildeas may dispute Plaintiff's claims and some or all of 
the Defendants may have rights or adverse claims to assert 
respecting the subject property. 
18. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2, Plaintiff is entitled 
to declaratory relief to be granted by this court to determine 
the rights, claims or interests of the parties in and to the 
subject property. 
5 
s 
COUNT II 
(FRAUDULENT TRANSFER) 
19. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1 
through 18 herein. 
20. On or about August of 1992 the date of the purported 
Warranty Deed, Defendant Bruce Gildea with actual intent to 
hinder, delay or defeat Plaintiff's Judgment lien claim, 
instructed and directed Defendant Hale as seller of the subject 
property under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to convey the 
subject property to Defendant Schriever. 
21. Defendant is related by blood or marriage to either 
Defendant Bruce Gildea or Defendant Shirlynn Gildea and the 
arrangement for the conveyance of the subject property to 
Defendant Schriever was for the benefit of the Gildeas and was 
without any actual change in the ownership or possession of the 
subject property. 
22. The conveyance or purported conveyance by Defendant 
Hale to Defendant Schriever and the arrangements corresponding 
thereto between Defendant Schriever and the Gildeas constituted 
fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the Utah Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq. 
23. Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that 
Plaintiff's Judgment lien is a valid and subsisting first lien 
against a one-half undivided interest in the subject property, 
which secures an unpaid balance due to Plaintiff in an amount to 
6 
<0 
be determined by the court which is in excess of $30,000.00, 
together with interest accruing at the rate of twenty percent 
(20%) per annum and that any adverse claims asserted by 
Defendants or any of them, are void as against the claim and 
interest of Plaintiff, as fraudulent transfers and arrangements. 
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS JUDGMENT UNDER COUNTS I AND II 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. For declaratory relief: 
(a) that Plaintiff's Judgment lien is a valid and 
subsisting lien against a one-half undivided interest in 
the subject property; 
(b) Plaintiff's lien is a first lien subordinate 
only to general real property taxes, and secures an 
unsatisfied balance due and owing Plaintiff in an amount to 
be determined by the court in excess of $30,000.00 together 
with interest accruing at the rate of twenty percent (20%) 
per annum, and; 
(c) that any rights or adverse claims of the other 
Defendants are extinguished or are subordinate to 
Plaintiff's Judgment lien, and; 
(d) that Defendant Bruce Gildea may not claim a 
homestead exemption to defeat or reduce Plaintiff's 
Judgment lien against the subject property; 
(e) that Plaintiff is entitled to direct the Salt 
7 
Lake County Sheriff to proceed with and complete execution 
proceedings and to cause the one-half interest in the 
subject property to be sold at execution sale to satisfy 
Plaintiff's Judgment together with all costs and expenses 
of such proceedings and additional attorney's fees 
necessitated thereby and by this action, the same being 
added to and augmenting the unpaid Judgment balance. 
2. For costs of this action and such other and further 
relief as the court deems just in the premises. 
DATED this ZZ day of^Cj/^^L 
>T ., 1993, 
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey 
Attorneys for Plaintif 
Plaintiff's Address: 
John C. Sittner 
682 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
:\wp\pleading\sit-gild\complaint. 1275-3c-01 
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EXHIBITA 
XaO taxootic* to ra.u.TSJ 
. D«p. Book. P a j * . Raf.i 
WARRANTY DEED 
Aonp 
JOT KALE AKA JOT HALE HORSLET 
©* SALT LAKE CITT . Co<raty of 
COtfVEY «dd WARRANT to 
SALT LAKE 
grantor 
, Suit of Utah, htrrby 
KAREN H. SQIR1EVER, TRUSTEE OF TOE KAREK H. SCHRIEVER PAMILT TRUST DATED 
JULY 2 0 , 1992. 
of 
TEX AKD OTHER GOOD AKD VALUABLE CONS IDERATION 
SALT LACE the following described tract of land In State of UUh: 
iTanU* 
for tht iurn of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
Co«»encfng at a point 1966.61 feet South and 599.48 feet East of th* 
Kortiwest corner of the Kortheast quarter of Sec t ion 27. Tovnship 1 South. 
Range 1 East . S a l t Lake Race and Meridian, and running th»nct» South 300.88 
f e / t ; thenct South 82*l0*East 231.96 f e e t ; thence north 13•30* Vest 341.81 
( e e t ; thence Vest ISO fee t t o the point of beg inning . 
TOGETHER VITU *nd subject t o a r ight of vay over: 
Co-^cocing at a point 1941.86 feet South and 47 .52 f ee t £ a s : fro« the 
Worthiest corner of the Northeast quarter of sa id Sec t ion 27, and running 
th*nce South 49.S f e e t ; tbenc* East 846.25 feet to the B r i g h t Young Ditch; 
thence North 27*06' Vest along sa id d i t c h 55 .63 f e e t ; thence Vest 821.10 
(vet t o the p lace of beg inn ing . 
WITNESS, the har>d cf aaW grantor , thU 
AUGUST , A. D. 19 92 
3rd day of 
fcijTvxi In tht Pr*»etkc* of 
•KTY KALE HORSLEY f 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Cooatycf SXLT UKE 
Oath* 3RD 
ptraooall/ a 
1-
. A. D. 19 g2 d*7 ot AUGUST 
JOT HALE AKA J0V KALE HORSLEY 
w*nU who duly »da>owUdr*d to ma that
 s ha txtcutad th« 
Hiding 
0 4 PRINTING CO. — *»*t u u i t m 
Notary Public. 
KxvfLyxz cm, ITAH 
CT Ird 
en 
en 
en 
en 
"D 
O 
en 
cx> 
EXHIBIT B 
• I 
}l 
I ' 
L. BENSON MADEY 
YANO» MURPHY, WBGGELAND <5c FRIED LAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
State Bar Number: A20 35 
Sail Lu:.?-':<ii-.:'.'«r.r.h 
25 1985 
'At* >»J O.f!. C'H.»: 
• • ^ i . ' * 
IN TliE THIRD DISTRICT COURT CF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BIG HORN TAR SANDS <5c OIL, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
TARBO, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and OTS 
RESEARCH, a Utah general 
partnership, J. ROBERT 
BRIMILALL, ARNOLD E. BERNEY, 
BRUCE G I L D E A , PETER E. 
BERNE*, DELL BRIMHALL, GARY 
BRIMHALL, BERNARD BERNEY, H. 
DELBERT WELKER and ARLON 
MILLER, 
Defendan ts• 
JUDGMENT 
Civi1 No. C-82-4804 
Assigned to Judge 
Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 
jj8, 1985 before the Honorable Judge Dennis Frederick. The Court 
«» 
• ' h a v i n g taken e v i d e n c e and h a v i n g madt <md e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s 
i : 
i! 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, docs, bas^d thereon, make and 
enter the following: 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY GRANTED: in favor of Plaintiff and 
against Defendants Peter Herney, Bruce Gildea, II. Dolourt 
Welker and Gary Drimhall with joint and several liability in 
the sum of $30,598.35 together with interest accruing thereon 
at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum from the date 
hereof until paid anci together with attorney's fees in the sum 
of $3250.00 and costs advanced in the amount of $4G.30. 
DATED this J& day of f/W- , 198 5. 
EY THE jCOURT: 
Deputy Clft»x 
i! 
$AH- I*** \v fy/ 
EXHIBIT C 
fiO.trO 
•9 
co 
Ef O 
2* 
418234? In iht District Court, .of the TbiW Judici^istif c& la and for. Silt U&e;€ount)rf State of Utah I 
HON, JUDGES OF SAID COUNTY 
J6hn C. Stttner 
.Term. 19 85 
o 
^O 
C O 
C* 
*» 
jar:
 3 
Plaintiff 
V*. 
fltg Horn Tar. Sands & O i l / Inc. , 
ee a l . 
No.. 
Execution 
C-82-4804 
Assigned to Judge Frederick 
DciJGiUPt 
THE.STATE OF UTAH 
To Xht ShcrifT or Coaiubfc of Sah Lake County, SuU of Utaf|, G.xctingi: 
WHEREAS, Jtfdjtmeat wss rendered by this Coait in said County, wherein is the judgment roth on the 25 
co6iofraKsiJ>,-iP250.06 
^iL.for'.hctumofS 3b,'59B.3S
 t n d s 4 6 , 3 0 . 
$ 3 3 , 8 9 4 , 6 5 
. attorney** fteft *ad the amount actual2>rduc 'hereon U $ 
25 th 
.day of November 
Defendant Bruce Oildea 
. and in)mart at the rate of^Sfa percent per annum frcm the 
. A.D. 19 . until pvskl a$\um wu«i 
^ in rnvorof *aJ4. * l « i n t i f f ^ o h a - C . S i t t n a r 
THESE A&E* THEREFORE* lo'cGiuawuvd $ou to coIVect t!*e aforesaid judgment aod costs, to^thct with tto con 
of ib« eascuilofl. ami fhtt yev levy oa &6d KJX enou&h of the unexercised personal proputy, or if enough a wxen>jrt ed 
p*rwn%f property qpnntt W foufed„' then of ton imexratpierf retf pcopirfty of the taid •• 
k
 Derandsut: Jiruco .Gtldsa 
to tttirfy ••* igaavgiii AH Kfctf ccitt afcn*i*3 hen .*• ao$ iWa aHU t » . y « m i ^ ^ lojtoESf, Aad withl* 
^ y ( C 6 ) < ^ i r w & ^ r t t ^ 
Givfti im&r my ba»d t&* tfct 5&J of awl Cc withfe •^iLma^bL 
S! 
S 
_ NOTICE Of REAL ESTATE LEVY 
E£KEB or im« ) 
) BS. Sat* Uk$*Coy&lK Sheriff's Office 
CODSTf OT S&LT I&PK ) 
Kotlc* U heraky given, thet un<}*r or/d by virtue of ft writ of EXECUTION Issued out 
°*
 t h
* D1STR1CJ Court of the State of Utah, cf which th* anncwad I* e true copy, I have 
this day attached end levied upon el l the right, t i t l e , clelm and lnt*r**t of 
BRUCE GILDEA, 
defendants, 
or either of thera, of. In end to the following described fte*! £st*te, ttsndlng on tho re-
cord* of Salt Lake Cocnty, In the nene of BRUCE GI IDEA. 
end particularly d*scrlb*d * t fe l lows; 
1. COMMERCING at * point 1988.61 feet South find 
589.48 fact East of tha Northwest corner of 
the Northeast quarter of Section 27, Township 
1 South, Bang* 1 Eaat, Salt L*kf Base and 
Meridian, and running thence South S00.88 
feotf thence South 82 •lO' 2aot 231.63 feet i 
thence North 13°J0t Wast 341.31 fect j ihenc* 
Wast 150 fact to the point of BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER with 0hd subject to a right of way 
over* CO&IKNC1BO at a point 1*41*88 fact 
South and 47;82 feet East from the Northwast 
cornar of tha Northaast quarter of said 
Section 27, and running thence South 48,5 
f e * t | thanca East 848.28 faat to tho Brighant 
Yo^n? Ditchj thence Korth 27°0Q1 West along 
said ditch 53.83 feet) thane* West 821.10 
feat to tha piece of BBOXRHINCJ. 
2. <X££JEHC1W3 83 rode South fcnd SOT.05 faat Weft 
from tha Northeast corner of tl*s Hortheftit 
quarter of Section S89 Tomifihlp 3 South, 
Rangt 1 West, Salt Lake Korldian, and running 
than** South 21.5 rodsi thanca Wast 40 faeif ^ 
thanoo North 21.6 rod*j thanca Bait 48 faet g! 
to tha piftsa of feagis&ing. ^ 
J. T*ia East 88 1/8 faat of Lot 88, Block 2, D* 
aonuiiL FLAGS, =• 
4. Farad Is £ta&i%nla& at a point ftl) dagraet 83 _ 
minutes Kast 86 fact froa tha Worth**st ra 
aorner of Lot 2, Bltak 1 Xfogna Addition, G3 
bainff in and part of Section SO, Township 1 
South, Eanffe 2 Wast* Salt Lake Sfc*a afcrt 
Meridian; and ruanlr,g thanca South 0 dserpsR 
82 minutes ZMK 28 fawtj th«n®e north 88 
dsgraas 83 lainytas East 124*6 fo«tj thanco 
north 8 daffraas 32 raimitas tfaat 28 faat; 
thahca,South fin d$#f«>*s 63 minutes West 124.8 
faat to tha point of kaginains* 
k 
2 
Being the Ba*t'8i feet of V>t 25, Block 2, 
Garden Lot Addition* an unrecorded 
subdivision. 
Parcel 2t The Bait 89 feat of Lot S3, Block 
1, Garden Lot^Addition, en unrecorded 
subdivision,^and being more particularly 
described as foHowai 
Beginning at a point North 88 degrees S3 
minutes East 86 feet from the northeast 
corner of Lot 1, Block 1 tUgnr, Addition, 
being a part of Section SO, Township 1 South, 
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thene© South 0 degrees 52 raiautes 
East SB feet) thence North 68 degrees S3 
minute* East 114.8 feet) thence North 0 
decrees 81 minutes West IS feet; thence South 
*8 degrees S3 minutes West 114.8 feet to the 
place of beginning. 
B2QIHH1HG at the Southwest Corner of Lot 1, 
Block 77, Plat "D", Salt Leke.Clty ?urvey and 
running thence Bast 45.8 fcetf thence North 
S7 feet) thenoe Wfcst 41.8 feet) thence South 
87 feet to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at a point tthich is South 714.25 
feet and West 38.48 feet frcra the northeast 
corner of Section 38, Totmship 1 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Baca and Meridian; and 
running thence South 195.00 feet; thence West 
418.17 foet} tfcenca North 108.01 feet) thence 
East 318.77 feet) thenee South 80.00 feet) 
tfconce East 80.00 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Subject to an (tzirtt&g fence line running 
along; the above described property snare 
particularly described as follows 
^«tt-a:pfclht ca «.* *xi*ti*tt '.f#ne» 
•*•''• " ' 6«$re«0 .12 
.
 >r -_.,,... , , •f««ti*ml/Boutb 
Ead^tP^feYia mitu.tc#.li.8«eo'&d^,^tt i s f«tt 
Wf.'e;!, Ife8-f*At'^ ferid flo<Ath,«*V<J»ffC««6 30 talnutoa 
lt;Heop&<lfest/3tf ;Jltf««t .tran.tW: , 
nortBiiact^irnaf o tS^c t i ca l f i , T&ra6hlp 2 
8«Stfft iRftgt'gl;MftttySel t Lake Beta* sia<s 
'H:tfiiBUt*S^«it filoQfeaia fec<i9MIii* 184.88 
Zrtt"6Ma&tb* forth' 1/1 of Let 8?, Bleek 3, 
AggBSB MAfr 06? KgNVB&'l&ACSi 
AU.Of.LfcVSJ. 9tf&.GA&3$S8 
V > 
i&& 
J0CEKU<4*2t5 
3536037 
NOTICE OF EXISTING UNIFORM REAL ESTATE COHTRACT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to the terns and provisions of a 
certain Uniform Real Estate Contract da tedFebroary 20, 1981 which was 
heretofore duly executed and which now continues to be in full fcrce and e f f ec t , 
the undersigned parties tr^ t.\ s e l l e r and buyer of the fo1lowing described 
tract of land situated 1n Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wlt: 
hefjr t o Exhibit "A" attached 
ht no and ry his reference 
mode a part .tui.*eo£. 
7i HALE / ~ Sel ler GIUDEA Buyer 
^<&Au%Jl<r>Yr> J&kfa+L. 
CIIIRL^NN $tLDEA Bayer 
STATE OF WfcH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT IAKE ) 
OP t h i s 20th day o f Febru-iry , 1 ? 8 L p e r s o n a l l y aupeared 
before me JOY HALE, a s s e l l e r and R^UCE GHSSA and SKERLYW GILDEA, 
husband and w i f e , a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , a s Buyers 
the s i g n e r of the w i t h i n Instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me tha t they 
executed the same. 
' • . / ' ' My CQiim>t^ion e x p i r e s : 
V"\ FO^ J ' 
Notary P^>Tic - residing at 
Salt Lake Qounty, Otah 
V 
S
 Mi 3 &i | 
6 
IV 
ATCfH 
FAHliJIT "A" 
COMMENCING at a p n t 1966.61 feet Sou'r, ana 5;9.48 feet 
Ess*- of the Bsrthwoj. corner of the Northeast quaiter of 
Section 27, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence South 300.88 feet; 
thence South 82°10t East 231.96 feet; thence North 13*30' 
West 341.81 feet, thence West 150 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER with and subject tc a right of way over: 
COMMENCING at a point 1941.86 feet South and 47.52 feet 
East from the Northwest corner of the Northeast quarter 
of said Section 27 and running thence South 49.5 feet, 
thence Ea*t 846.25 feet to the Brigham Young Ditch; 
thence North 27°06' West along said ditch 55.63 feet; 
thence West 821.10 feet to the place of BEGINNING. 
C/T 
a 
h 
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L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035) 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 53 3-8505 
Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner 
Bv 
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SALT LAKS COUNTY , 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER SETTING ASIDE AND 
VACATING PRIOR ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
DEFENDANTS SCHRIEVER & GILDEAS 
AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. 930904459 CV 
JUDGE Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant Joy Hale's motion for summary judgment and 
Plaintiff John C. Sittnerfs motion to alter or amend the court's 
prior ruling and order granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants Karen H. Schriever and Bruce Gildea and 
Shirlynn Gildea, came on for hearing before the court on August 
19, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. L. Benson Mabey appeared as 
counsel for Plaintiff, John C. Sittner; William D. Marsh 
appeared as counsel for Defendant, Karen H. Schriever; and, 
Grant W.P. Morrison appeared as counsel for Defendants, Bruce 
Gildea and Shirlynn Gildea. Randall E. Grant was unable to 
appear, but Grant W.P. Morrison acted with his permission on his 
^sx 
behalf with respect to the matters before the court. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff commenced this action contending that he held a 
judgment lien against certain real property, which Defendants 
Gildeas and Defendant Schriever have or claim an ownership 
interest in and seeking, inter alia, declaratory relief under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 to determine the rights, claims or 
interest of the parties in the subject real property. 
Both Defendants Schriever and Gildeas filed answers that 
affirmatively asserted, inter alia, that the judgment was 
extinguished by Bruce Gildea's prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceedings and discharge order. After Plaintiff sent out one 
set of interrogatories and request for documents to each of the 
Defendants and answers were received, Defendant Schriever filed 
a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's 
Complaint and an award of attorney's fees and costs under § 78-
27-56. In response Plaintiff filed a cross motion for partial 
summary judgment that the judgment and lien were valid and that 
execution proceedings should be completed. Defendants Gildeas 
responded by filing a cross motion for summary judgment seeking 
the same relief as Defendant Schriever. 
On April 26, 1994, the court heard oral arguments and 
announced its ruling that the effect of Bruce Gildea's discharge 
in bankruptcy was to extinguish the debt which extinguished the 
2 
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judgment and lien as well. The court also ruled that the suit 
was not well taken and was frivolous and therefore the court 
ruled that Defendants Gildeas and Schriever were entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Following the court's announced ruling, Defendant Joy Hale 
filed a motion for summary judgment also seeking an award of 
attorney's fees from Plaintiff under UCA § 78-27-56. Defendant 
Schriever's counsel prepared proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and Plaintiff filed objections to the 
proposed findings and conclusions. However, at a hearing on May 
18, 1994, the court declined to adopt the proposed findings and 
conclusions, but entered a partial judgment excluding the amount 
of attorney fees to be awarded Defendants. 
Thereafter, Defendants submitted affidavits setting forth 
their claim for attorney's fees and Plaintiff submitted an 
opposing affidavit and objected to the entry of attorney's fees 
and filed a motion pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 59 U.R.C.P. to 
alter or amend the court's prior ruling and partial judgment and 
submitted a supporting memorandum. Defendants submitted 
opposing memorandum and the matter was heard before the court. 
II, BASIS FOR COURT'S RULING AND ORDER 
The court determined that it was appropriate to reconsider 
it's prior ruling granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants Schriever and Gildeas. The court having reconsidered 
3 
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such ruling and evaluated the memoranda of the parties in 
support and opposition thereto, determined that it's prior 
ruling was based upon an error in law and that the partial 
summary judgment based thereon should be set aside and vacated. 
The court determined that Defendant Bruce Gildeafs prior 
bankruptcy and bankruptcy discharge order did not render 
Plaintiff's Sittner's judgment lien invalid, nor was the 
judgment lien avoided in the course of the bankruptcy 
proceedings and the effect of the prior stipulation made between 
the Gildea bankruptcy trustee and Sittner's attorney reserved 
the judgment lien on the specific real property which is the 
subject matter of this action. 
Since such judgment lien was not affirmatively avoided as 
a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, the court concludes that 
under applicable case law such judgment and lien survived the 
Gildea bankruptcy case and discharge order and is an enforceable 
lien against the specific real property, at least in rem, and 
that partial summary judgment should be granted in favor of 
Plaintiff Sittner that the judgment lien survived the bankruptcy 
and that execution proceedings could be completed or issued for 
purposes of such judgment lien as against the specific real 
property that the lien had attached to prior to the bankruptcy 
petition of Defendant Bruce Gildea. 
The court expressly reserves and makes no ruling upon the 
statute of limitations period respecting such judgment lien and 
4 
reserves and makes no ruling upon any claims between the parties 
as to priority of the judgment lien as between the interests of 
Plaintiff and Defendant Schriever, nor upon the amount of the 
judgment secured by the lien. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the court does now make and enter 
the following orders: 
1* The court's prior order of partial judgment signed on 
May 18, 1994 is set aside and vacated and is of no further force 
and effect. 
2. Plaintiff's judgment and lien were a valid and 
subsisting judgment lien against the specific real property 
involved in the subject action and such judgment and lien 
survived the bankruptcy case and discharge order of Defendant 
Bruce Gildea. 
3. That further proceedings may be taken by the parties 
respecting the remaining issues and claims involved in the 
pending action in accordance with the court's above stated 
ruling and orders herein. 
DATED this / day of kf^^J>& , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
/honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
/ T h i r d D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
c:\wp\pleading\sit-gfld.\ord-set.8um 1275-3c-01 
5 
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L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035) 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. 930904459 CV 
JUDGE Homer F. Wilkinson 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the date hereof, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the: proposed ORDER SETTING 
ASIDE AND VACATING PRIOR ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO DEFENDANTS SCHRIEVER & GILDEAS AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF, by depositing the same in U.S. 
mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the following parties: 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorney for Defendants Bruce Gildea 
& Shirlynn Gildea 
1200 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
MVrt 
William D, Marsh 
Attorney for Karen H. Schriever 
One Utah Center, Suite 900 
201 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Randall E. Grant 
GRANT & GRANT, A.P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Joy Hale 
349 South 200 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ll day of (llM.i W DATED this r1 day of l.WCIU.V.1 1994 
Kristi A. Jofgens^ pn 
c:\wp\pleading\sit-gild.\cert-of.ser 1275-3c-01 
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L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035) 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner 
- ^ Judicial 0i* 
_ f L A K £ COUNTY 
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 930904459 CV 
JUDGE Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff John C. Sittner1s objections to findings and 
conclusions and motion to alter or amend findings, conclusions 
and judgment and motion for a stay, came on for hearing before 
the Court on September 26, 1995 at the hour of 8:00 a.m. L. 
Benson Mabey appeared as counsel for Plaintiff, William Morrison 
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, 
William Marsh appeared as counsel for Defendant Karen H. 
Schriever and Randy Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy 
Hale. The Court reviewed the moving and opposing memoranda 
submitted by the parties and heard oral argument from counsel 
for the parties and was then fully advised in the premises and 
|0O° 
ready to rule. 
The Court acknowledged that its ruling at the hearing on 
June 28, 1995 granting summary judgment for Defendants of 
dismissal with an award of attorney's fees against Plaintiff, 
was based upon the order entered by the United States Bankruptcy 
Court on June 14, 1995 in Case No. 86A-20168, and that since the 
entry of the bankruptcy order, Plaintiff moved the U.S. District 
Court for a stay of the effect of the bankruptcy order and the 
U.S. District Court entered an order on August 31, 1995 in Case 
No. 2:95CV664C (consolidated with Case No. 95-CV-613C) that 
stayed the effect of the bankruptcy court's order during the 
pendency of the appeal and review by the U.S. District Court. 
The Court determined that the effect of the stay order prevents 
issue preclusion based on the bankruptcy order until the 
completion of the U.S. District Court's review and accordingly 
serves as a sound and proper basis for staying further 
proceedings in this action pending the outcome of such appellate 
review. Based thereon and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment signed by this court on August 15, 1995 are suspended 
and fully stayed as to any effect and all further proceedings in 
this case are stayed pending the completion by the U.S. District 
Court of its appellate review of the bankruptcy court's order of 
June 14, 1995, such review taking place under the case caption 
2 
loo\ 
John C. Sittner v. Bruce L. Gildea, Case No, 2:95CV664C 
(consolidated with Case No, 95-CV-613C). 
2. The Court directs that if the U.S. District Court 
affirms the bankruptcy judge's order, then the parties shall 
confer upon Plaintifffs objections to the proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and if the parties are unable to 
agree upon them then further proceedings before the Court may be 
taken. If the U.S. District Court reverses or otherwise vacates 
the bankruptcy court's order, then the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment based thereon shall also be 
vacated and the parties may then apply for further proceedings 
in this case. 
DATED this / day of _ , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
T^T^c^L 
lonorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Third District Court Judge 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS fS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINS DOC'JV^'T CN F'LE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT*. ,r '.TL.KE COUNTY,STATE 
DeFUTY J  CCURT CLERK 
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Grant W. P. Morrison 3666 
Morrison & Morrison, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
IN THE 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. SITTNER, 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE : 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA : 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, : Civil No. 930904459cv 
Defendants. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant 
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants 
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on 
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on 
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as 
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as 
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison 
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and 
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The 
MAR 2 5 1997 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
1 
court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and 
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of 
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action 
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the 
record the basis for its opinion, and having entered its FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and good cause appearing, NOW 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADCTUDGES, AND DECREES: 
1. Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein 
is hereby dismissed on its merits and with prejudice, 
2. Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein 
is barred by the statute of limitations. 
3. Def endants are herewith awarded their costs and reasonable 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. The amounts of 
attorney fees is preserved for later determination by this Court 
and are to be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to 
include any fees incurred in other actions before the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court or U.S. District Court. 
DATED this _J~ ^ day of ^) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ O 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
2 
Grant W. P. Morrison 3666 
Morrison & Morrison, L.C. 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial D;si::c! 
MAR 2 5 1997 
-SA t I LAKE COUNTY 
By :>'X<&\Ml>s. ^ 
JOHN C. SITTNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE 
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA 
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY 
HALE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 930904459cv 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant 
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants 
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on 
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on 
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240 
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as 
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as 
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison 
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and 
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The 
1 
court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and 
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of 
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action 
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the 
record the basis for its opinion, and good cause appearing, DOES 
HEREBY MAKE AND ENTER THE FOLLOWING: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 20, 1981, Defendant Joy Hale, as 
seller, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Defendants 
Bruce Gildea and shirlynn Gildea, as buyers. Under the terms of the 
contract Ms. Hale agreed to sell and the Gildeas agreed to buy a 
house and lot located in Salt Lake County at 2400 East 3000 South. 
2. On November 25, 1985, Plaintiff John C. Sittner obtained 
judgment against Defendant Bruce Gildea and others in the amount of 
$30,598.35 together with an award of costs, attorney's fees of 
$3,250.00 and interest at the rate of 20% per annum. 
3. In January of 1986 Defendant Bruce Gildea, filed 
bankruptcy proceedings in the Untied States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah. 
4. Plaintiff Sittner and his attorney L. Benson Mabey filed 
a claim with the United States Bankruptcy Court as unsecured 
creditors based upon Sittner's judgment. 
5. During the course of Defendant Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy, 
Bankruptcy Trustee, Duane H. Gillman, filed an Adversarial 
Complaint, under Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to avoid 
the judgment lien asserted by Plaintiff Sittner alleging the same 
2 
constituted a preferential transfer in violation of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Plaintiff through his attorney L. Benson Mabey thereupon 
entered into a stipulation with Trustee Gillman agreeing to the 
following terms: 
"1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives 
any right to assert a secured claim in and to 
any property of this estate or any funds which 
constitute proceeds of property of this estate 
and acknowledges that any and all claim he has 
is an unsecured, pre-petition claim. 
Defendants rights respecting property 
abandoned by the estate or not administered by 
closing are preserved and unaffected hereby." 
6. Plaintiff John C. Sittner thereupon secured payment of 
$4,302.99 from Trustee Gillman as Sittner's share of distribution 
to unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73. 
7. On December 14, 1987, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen 
entered a DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR Order discharging Defendant Bruce 
Gildea from all personal liability under Plaintiff Sittner's 
judgment. 
8. On February 19, 1988 Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued 
an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to secured creditor Joy 
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property. 
9. In January of 1992, Defendant Joy Hale sold her interest 
in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract to Defendant karen H. 
Schriever for the unpaid balance of the contract as discounted for 
cash. 
10. On August 3, 1992 Defendant Hale Conveyed and Warranted 
clear title to the property to Karen H. Schriever, Trustee of the 
Karen H. Schriever Family Trust, dated July 20, 1992. Upon purchase 
3 
of the vendor's interest in the subject property Defendant 
Schriever assumed Mrs. Hale's position as contract seller to the 
Gildeas. 
11. On June 28, 1993 Plaintiff Sittner brought action to 
impress the subject realty with a judgment lien "as a valid and 
subsisting first lien against a one-half undivided interest in the 
subject property", asserting said judgment lien had an "unpaid 
balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate of 20% 
per annum. 
12. In a companion cause of action Plaintiff Sittner alleged 
that Defendant Schriever's purchase, from Defendant Hale, of the 
vendor interest in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract 
"constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the Utah 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 25-6-1 et 
seq" and that the Warranty Deed from Hale to Schriever was issued 
"with actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat" the judgment lien 
claimed by Plaintiff Sittner. 
13. There has been no conveyance of any sort by Defendant 
Bruce Gildea, of his one half interest in the subject property. The 
Gildeas retciin a vendee's interest under the installment purchase 
contract and continue to occupy the subject property as their 
family residence. 
14. Defendant Bruce Gildea is not insolvent and he has no 
indebtedness to Plaintiff John C. Sittner. 
15. Plaintiff Sittner's judgment was entered November 25, 
1985. Enforcement of the judgment has at no time been stayed by/on 
4 
appeal and no action to renew the judgment has been undertaken. 
16. The eight (8) year statutory period for foreclosing 
Plaintiff's judgment lien has expired, notwithstanding any tolling 
periods that could have been caused by Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his 
judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce Gildea's 
estate was waived during the course of Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy. 
Mr. Sittner stipulated to avoidance of the judgment lien in order 
to participate in the distribution to unsecured creditors. 
2. Plaintiff is not a creditor of any named defendant and has 
no basis in law to contest any transfer of property by any of them. 
Plaintiff had no grounds for suing defendants Hale and Schriever 
for fraudulent transfer of property. 
3. Had the claimed judgment lien survived the Gildea 
bankruptcy, enforcement of the lien would have been barred by the 
statute of limitations for foreclosing judgment liens. 
4. Plaintiff's claims are without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
5. There are no genuine issues of material fact and 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
6. Defendant Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be, and is hereby, granted. Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment should be, and is hereby, denied. All 
other motions pending before the court, including motions to take 
5 
depositions and compel further discoveryf are rendered moot. 
7. Judgment should be granted against Plaintiff dismissing 
this action with prejudice and awarding all defendants reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in the defense of this action as provided 
under Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56, as amended. Attorney's fees are to 
be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to include any 
fees incurred in other actions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court or 
U.S. District Court. 
DATED this day of <*&^t~o^L- 1997 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
\^35 
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1 8 7 J 8 L A K E COUNTY 
2 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCI ^ ^ 
3 IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
4 
5 JOHN C. SITTNER, 
6 Plaintiff, 
7 vs. 
8 KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, 
9 TRUSTEE OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER 
10 FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA, 
11 SHIRLYNN GILDEA, AND JOY HALE, : 
12 Defendants. : 
13 
14 BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25tn day of February. 
15 1997. the above-entitled matter continued in hearing session in Courtroom No. 
16 502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, Salt 
17 Lake City, Utah before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third 
18 Judicial District, State of Utah. 
19 APPEARANCES 
20 L. Benson Mabey. Attomey-at-Law. Murphy, Tolboe & 
21 Mabey, 124 South 600 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 Telephone 
22 533-8505 appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
23 William P. Marsh. Attornev-at-Law, One Utah Center, Suite 
24 900, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 535-4659 
25 appearing on behalf of Defendant Karen H. Schriever. 
1 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
ON SUNDRY MOTIONS: 
COURT'S RULING 
Case No. 930904459 
Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson 
2 
1 Grant W.P. Morrison. Attomev-at-Law, 1200 East 3300 
2 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84106 Telephone 485-7999 appearing on behalf of 
3 Defendants Gildea. 
4 Randall E. Grant. Attomev-at-Law, 349 South 200 East, 
5 Suite 410, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 appearing on behalf of Defendant Joy 
6 Hale. 
7 
8 
9 
10 (Whereupon, the following proceedings continued in open 
11 court:) 
12 THE COURT: Counsel, I've spent considerable time on this 
13 case in the last weeks in going over what has taken place, and my actions in it. 
14 It appears this court has waivered somewhat as far as its decision in the case, 
15 and maybe caused some concern. 
16 Of course I don't think that what Mr. Mabey says as far as 
17 collateral estoppel is the only condition under which I granted the summary 
18 judgment of August 15th, although there's no question that the bankruptcy court 
19 had taken a stand on the case, and I felt they had more jurisdiction than this 
20 court did. 
21 It appears that the federal district judge who dealt with the 
22 question said the state court should make the decision on it, and that's fine; I 
23 have no problem with that. It's before me. 
24 I'm going to make a decision, and this is notwithstanding the 
25 other decision that may have been made in this case. 
1 I'm going to grant to the defendant their third motion for 
2 summary judgment. I think it is well-taken. It was the way the court reasoned 
3 earlier, and the court reversed itself. I'm persuaded, as I pulled the cases and 
4 looked at them, and I'm also persuaded - and I did not rule on the statute of 
5 limitations before - that what counsel has said, counsel for the defendant, as far 
6 as the statute of limitations, the limitation has run on this, and the court is 
7 granting the motion for summary judgment on the merits of the case as well as 
8 the statute of limitations, and also awarding attorneys fees and costs to the 
9 defendant. 
10 Now, with this ruling, I know that there are four, five, six 
11 other motions, as far as motions to take depositions and motions to compel and 
12 motions for further discovery and so forth. I think all of those become moot. 
13 Now, if you think I have to go down each one of those, and 
14 rule on them, I will. I don't think it's necessary. I think all the other motions are 
15 moot in the case and I think that disposes of the case as far as this level is 
16 concerned. 
17 Now, as I say, I have awarded attorneys fees. I remember 
18 the last time we talked about them, but I'm going to award a reasonable 
19 attorneys fee, and I expect counsel to be reasonable. I want attorneys fees only 
20 for what has taken place in this case, not the case in the federal district court. 
21 Those are not attorneys fees awardable by this particular court. 
22 Now, I would anticipate that the attorneys fees are going to 
23 be higher than they should be because of the fact that they have been back and 
24 forth in this court, and that concerns me. I'm sorry for it, but that's the way it falls 
25 at this point. Any questions? 
1 MR. MABEY: Your Honor, did you state the reason for your 
2 granting was - not the statute of limitations; I understand that - but you also 
3 granted the third motion for summary judgment for other reasons? 
4 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
5 MR. MABEY: I take it that you're basing that on the opinion 
6 of the bankruptcy judge? 
7 THE COURT: No, no. I'm basing that on the merits of the 
8 case. Of course I've read the bankruptcy judge's decision, and, as I say, that 
9 goes into the consideration, but no, I have gone back, I have pulled this matter 
10 and looked at the cases, and I'm ruling on the merits. 
11 MR. MABEY: And that judgment was waived in the prior 
12 bankruptcy case. 
13 THE COURT: Yes, yes. 
14 MR. MABEY: Okay. 
15 MR. GRANT: Your Honor, you mentioned "the defendants." 
16 You're including Joy Hale in that. 
17 THE COURT: I am. Who's going to prepare the pleadings? 
18 MR. MORRISON: I'll prepare it, excuse me, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
20 MR. MORRISON: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 (Whereupon, at the approximate hour of 8:40 a.m., the 
22 instant proceedings came to a close.) 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
6 
7 I, Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter in the Third Judicial 
8 District, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
9 proceedings were, by me, stenographically reported at the times and places 
10 herein set forth; that said report was, by me subsequently reduced to printed 
11 form, consisting of the enumerated pages hereinbefore appearing; and that said 
12 report so transcribed constitutes a true and correct transcription of testimony 
13 given, evidence adduced and/or proceedings had as in the foregoing transcript 
14 hereinabove appended; portion only of entire proceedings being herein 
15 transcribed, pursuant to requested transcript content. 
16 To which certification I hereby set my hand this 26th day of 
17 February, 1997, at Salt Lake City. 
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21 Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
John C. Sittner, No. 981776 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Karen H. Schriever, Trustee of 
the Karen H. Schriever Family 
Trust; Bruce Gildea; Shirlynn 
Gildea; and Joy Hale, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: L. Benson Mabey, Salt Lake City, for Sittner 
William D. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Schriever 
Grant W. P. Morrison, Salt Lake City, for the Gildeas 
Randall E. Grant, Salt Lake City, for Hale 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice: 
II Plaintiff John Sittner seeks review of the court of 
appeals' denial of his petition for rehearing of a decision that 
dismissed Sittner's appeal as untimely. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 This case arises from a judgment that John Sittner 
obtained against Bruce Gildea in November 1985 and a judgment 
lien Sittner thereafter filed upon Gildea's real property. In 
January 1986, Gildea filed a bankruptcy petition, which suspended 
the execution sale of his property. After the bankruptcy 
proceedings concluded, Gildea remained in possession of the 
property. 
F I L E D 
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13 Sittner then filed a declaratory judgment action in the 
district court against Gildea and others (collectively, 
"defendants") who allegedly possessed an interest in the subject 
property. Sittner sought a declaration that his judgment lien 
was still attached to the property and that he was entitled to 
complete the execution sale. Defendants argued that Sittner's 
lien did not survive Gildea's discharge in bankruptcy. Sittner 
and defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which resulted 
in a series of judgments not pertinent to this appeal. 
14 On March 25, 1997, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. Concluding that Sittner's 
judgment lien did not survive the bankruptcy, the court dismissed 
Sittner's complaint and ordered Sittner to pay defendants' costs 
and reasonable attorney fees. The court expressly reserved the 
amount of attorney fees for later determination. 
15 At a fee hearing on June 11, 1997, the parties 
submitted to the trial court that they intended to stipulate to 
the amount of attorney fees. Sittner would not stipulate, 
however, to defendants' entitlement to attorney fees. The trial 
court requested that defendant Karen Schriever's counsel, 
William M. Marsh, prepare an appropriate stipulation along with a 
judgment to supplement the original March 25 judgment, 
incorporating the stipulated amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded to defendants. Marsh prepared the stipulation and 
presented it to Sittner's counsel, Lynn Benson Mabey, for review. 
Mabey made and initialed handwritten changes to the stipulation 
and signed the appended signature page. 
16 Thereafter, Marsh created a revised typewritten copy of 
the stipulation that incorporated some, but not all, of Mabey's 
handwritten, changes and included additional material that was not 
present in the original stipulation. Marsh then appended to the 
second stipulation the signature page from the original 
stipulation that Mabey had signed and filed it with the court 
along with a corresponding supplemental judgment specifying the 
amount of attorney fees to be awarded. Marsh did not provide a 
copy of this second stipulation to Mabey. The trial court signed 
the supplemental judgment specifying the fee award on June 27, 
1997. 
17 On July 25, 1997, Sittner moved, pursuant to rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,1 to vacate the stipulation 
1
 This rule states in pertinent part: 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(Continued on next page.) 
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and the June 27 supplemental judgment that proceeded from it. 
Sittner alleged as the basis for his rule 60(b) motion that Marsh 
had fraudulently altered the stipulation. On the same basis, 
Sittner also moved for sanctions against Marsh pursuant to 
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
58 While Sittner's rule 60(b) motion was pending, Sittner 
requested from the trial court two fifteen-day extensions of the 
time for filing a notice of appeal from the June 27 supplemental 
judgment.2 The court granted both requests, on July 28 and 
August 11, respectively, and extended the time for filing an 
appeal to August 26, 1997. Sittner did not file a notice of 
appeal before the August 26 deadline. 
59 On August 25, 1997, the day before the time for filing 
an appeal was to expire, the court held an informal hearing with 
Mabey and Marsh in the form of a telephone conference. Marsh 
conceded that the original stipulation with Mabey's handwritten 
revisions was the stipulation to which the parties had agreed. 
The court stated that, prior to making a decision on the 
rule 60 (b) motion, it would be necessary to compare the original 
stipulation including the handwritten revisions with the second 
stipulation filed by Marsh. The court directed Mabey to submit a 
redlined copy of the stipulation highlighting the differences 
between the two stipulations. The court concluded in the course 
of the hearing that it would be appropriate to vacate the June 27 
supplemental judgment pending further consideration of Sittner's 
rule 60(b) motion, and requested that Mabey prepare an 
appropriate order. On September 29, 1997, this order was 
1
 (Footnote continued.) 
(b) . . . . On motion and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
2
 Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) permits the trial 
court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, to 
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal up to an additional 
thirty days. 
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entered, vacating the June 27 supplemental judgment, which fixed 
the amount of attorney fees, but leaving intact the March 25 
judgment dismissing Sittner's complaint and awarding attorney 
fees. 
110 On October 21, 1997, after considering Sittner's 
rule 60(b) motion, his motion for rule 11 sanctions, and his 
submission of the changes made to the stipulation, the court 
entered an order (1) denying the motion to set aside the 
stipulation, provided that the stipulation be corrected to 
conform with the language to which the parties originally agreed, 
and (2) denying the motion for rule 11 sanctions.3 In addition, 
the court issued a new supplemental judgment awarding attorney 
fees. This October 21 supplemental judgment, based on the 
corrected stipulation, fixed the amount of attorney fee^ to be 
awarded to defendants. 
ill Finally, on November 14, 1997, Sittner filed a notice 
of appeal in which he stated that his appeal was from "the entire 
judgment, including the Summary Judgment entered March 25, 1997." 
Sittner's appeal was transferred to the court of appeals, which 
filed a memorandum decision dismissing Sittner's appeal as 
untimely. The court of appeals based its dismissal upon Taylor 
v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), which held that an 
order is final "even though the issue of the amount of fees to be 
awarded [is] still pending before the trial court as of the date 
the notice of appeal was filed." Id. at 928. The court of 
appeals reasoned that under Taylor, Sittner was precluded from 
appealing the March 25 judgment because he did not file a 
separate notice of appeal within thirty days of that judgment. 
Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that Sittner was not 
entitled to appeal the June 27 supplemental judgment because his 
rule 60(b) motion did not toll the time for filing an appeal from 
that judgment. After the court of appeals dismissed, Sittner 
filed a petition for rehearing which the court of appeals denied. 
H12 Before this court on certiorari, Sittner seeks reversal 
of the court of appeals' ruling. He argues that (1) this court 
should expressly overrule Taylor; (2) the notice of appeal was 
properly filed from the October 21 supplemental judgment; 
(3) this court can now reach the merits of this case; and 
3
 In this order, the trial court also "affirmed" the 
September 29 order vacating the June 27 supplemental judgment, 
apparently upon the belief that it was necessary to do so because 
the September 29 order was entered "pending further review" of 
Sittner's rule 60(b) motion. 
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(4) sanctions should be imposed against Marsh and damages awarded 
to Sittner. 
513 Defendants contend that (1) under Taylor, Sittner 
failed to timely appeal from the March 25 judgment; (2) even 
disregarding Taylor, Sittner's appeal was untimely because he 
failed to file a separate notice of appeal from the June 27 
supplemental judgment; (3) Sittner failed to preserve below the 
issues he raises on appeal; (4) defendants are entitled to 
damages because Sittner's appeal is frivolous; and (5) sanctions 
should be imposed against Mabey for making false representations. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
514 "x0n certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court.'" Bear River Hut. 
Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 14, 978 P.2d 460 (quoting State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)). We review the court of 
appeals' legal conclusions for correctness and grant them no 
deference. See Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 510, 984 P.2d 987. 
ANALYSIS 
I. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
515 Before we examine the court of appeals' decision, we 
must resolve whether Sittner failed to preserve below the issues 
he now raises on appeal. Defendants contend that to preserve the 
right to appeal from the March 25 judgment or the June 27 
supplemental judgment, it was necessary for Sittner to file post-
judgment motions with the trial court specifically objecting to 
those judgments. We disagree. 
116 Defendants correctly state the general rule that 
failure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a 
party from raising that argument on appeal. See Malibu Inv. Co. 
v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 134, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. However, this 
rule does not require a party to file a post-judgment motion 
before the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an appeal. 
See, e.g., Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (XN>It is settled that . . . a rule 59 motion is [not] a 
condition precedent to appeal from final judgment.'" (quoting 
Nature Conservancy v. Nakila, 671 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1983))). 
117 The primary issue in the instant case is whether 
Sittner's notice of appeal was timely filed. It would be absurd 
to require Sittner to raise such an issue of appellate procedure 
before the trial court, which would have lacked authority and 
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jurisdiction to decide the issue. Moreover, the merits of 
Sittner's appeal, which we do not address today, can be 
summarized as two issues: (1) whether the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and (2) whether 
defendants are entitled to attorney fees. Sittner's arguments on 
these two issues are fully briefed in his own summary judgment 
memorandum, his memoranda in opposition to defendants' motions 
for summary judgment, and other pleadings filed below. He 
therefore preserved below the issues he now raises on appeal. 
II. TIMELINESS OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
518 We now turn to the primary issue in the instant case: 
whether Sittner's notice of appeal was timely filed. 
Specifically, we must determine whether Sittner is entitled to 
appeal the March 25 judgment when he did not file his notice of 
appeal until after the October 21 supplemental judgment was 
entered. 
519 We first examine whether it was necessary for Sittner 
to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the March 25 
judgment. The court of appeals held that it was necessary and 
dismissed Sittner's appeal on this ground. The court of appeals 
cited Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), which held that the time for filing an appeal begins to 
run from the entry of judgment even if the amount of attorney 
fees to be awarded has not been decided. The court of appeals' 
reliance upon Taylor is nullified by our recent decision in 
ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27. We held in ProMax that "in the interest of judicial economy, 
a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees 
awardable to a party before the judgment becomes final for the 
purposes of an appeal." Id. at 1115. We thus overrule Taylor and 
hold that under ProMax, Sittner's appeal is not precluded by his 
failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the 
March 25 judgment because that judgment—which failed to fix the 
amount of attorney fees to be awarded—was not final for purposes 
of appeal. 
520 We next must determine whether it was necessary for 
Sittner to file a notice of appeal from the June 27 supplemental 
judgment. The trial court extended the deadline for filing a 
notice of appeal from the June 27 supplemental judgment to 
August 26, 1997. Sittner did not file a notice of appeal before 
that deadline, but instead filed a motion pursuant to rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of appeals held 
that Sittner's rule 60(b) motion "did not toll the appeal period" 
and that, even if Taylor did not apply, the period for appealing 
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the March 25 judgment or the June 27 supplemental judgment 
expired on August 26. We disagree. 
121 The court of appeals correctly observed that a motion 
filed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) "does not 
extend or toll the thirty-day period in which appeals in the 
original action must be filed." Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P. 2d 
1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); see also Lord v. Lord, 709 P.2d 338, 338 
n.l (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("Rule 60(b) motions do not toll the 
time for appeal.") ; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation."). Indeed, it has been noted: 
An application for relief from a judgment 
under Rule 60(b) . . . does not extend the 
time for taking an appeal. Even if the court 
hears and denies the motion before the appeal 
time would have run, the appeal must be taken 
with the prior period measured from the date 
of the judgment, not from denial of the 
motion. 
11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2871, at 421 (2d ed. 1995). 
522 However, the period in which to appeal a final judgment 
is measured differently when the trial court grants the 
rule 60(b) motion. Specifically, "[i]f . . . the court grants 
the [rule 60(b)] motion and enters a new judgment, the time for 
appeal will date from the entry of that judgment." Id. at 
421-22. Indeed, a final, appealable order results "when the 
court not only relieves a party of judgment, but enters a 
corrected judgment so that there is nothing further to be decided 
by the district court.'' 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68 [2] 
(3d ed. 1997) . 
123 In the instant case, the trial court informed the 
parties at the August 25 hearing that the court was vacating the 
June 27 supplemental judgment. Indeed, that judgment was vacated 
within the appeal period, leaving no final disposition of the 
amount of attorney fees, and under ProMax, no final judgment from 
which to appeal. Sittner's only course of action was to wait 
until the trial court entered a new supplemental judgment that 
conclusively determined the amount of attorney fees. When the 
trial court entered the October 21 supplemental judgment, the 
amount of attorney fees was finally decided and the time for 
filing an appeal began to run. Thus, Sittner's notice of appeal, 
filed within thirty days of the October 21 supplemental judgment, 
was timely. On appeal, Sittner is entitled to seek review of the 
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merits of both the March 25 judgment dismissing his complaint and 
awarding attorney fees and the October 21 supplemental judgment 
fixing the amount of attorney fees, which together constituted a 
final appealable judgment. 
III. SANCTIONS AND DAMAGES 
524 Both Sittner and defendants have requested sanctions 
and damages. Sittner requested before the trial court that 
sanctions be imposed against Marsh for filing the revised 
stipulation without Mabey's consent and without giving Mabey a 
copy. Defendants now argue that Mabey should be sanctioned for 
making allegedly false representations in his appellate brief, 
and seek damages for an allegedly frivolous appeal. In turn, 
Sittner argues that defendants' claim of a frivolous appeal is 
itself frivolous and requests attorney fees and costs incurred in 
responding thereto. 
525 Because we review only the court of appeals' decision 
on certiorari, we do not address whether it was proper for the 
trial court to deny Sittner's request for sanctions against Marsh 
for filing the altered stipulation. Moreover, we deny Sittner's 
and defendants' additional requests for sanctions, damages, 
attorney fees, and costs, to the extent their requests derive 
from Sittner's writ of certiorari before this court. 
CONCLUSION 
526 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals which 
dismissed this appeal as untimely, and remand to the court of 
appeals for review of the merits of Sittner's appeal and other 
appropriate action. 
527 Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, 
and Justice Wilkins concur in Associate Chief Justice Russon's 
opinion. 
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Appendix 7 
IN THE UTEO STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In r e 
B r u c e L . 
T 
Gildea, j Bankruptcy Case No. 86A-00163 
) 
Debtor(s},. ) PROOF OF CLAIM 
Please print or type. Attach additional pages 1f needed. 
1. Claimant's name and address: 
4. 
5. 
John C. S i t t n e r 
350 South 
Sal t Lake 
400 East, 
City , Utah 
Suite 110 
34111 
The debtor was on the date the bankruptcy pet i t ion was f i l e d , and s t i l l i s , 
indebted to this claimant in the sum of $ 3 6 , 2 2 8 . 7 3 , which includes: 
$ 3 3 , 3 9 4 . 6 5 principal ( i f applicable) 
$ 9 6 5 . 7 7 earned interes t ( i f applicable) $18.57 interest per diem 
$ 1 , 3 6 8 . 3 1 
The debtor owes t h i s roney because 
Jjdspeat entered Navenfcer 25^ _ 1985 
other (explain) P° s t : judgnent execution costs and 
attorneys tees "~ 
A copy of any writing upon which th i s claim i s based is attached. 
The only security interest (col lateral) held for this claim i s : 
Judgment 
• (attach writing, if any) 
X Unsecured $ 36,228,73 plus $18.57 per diem interest 
Secured* $ 
Priority** $ 
6. The claim i s 
$ 36.223.73 TOTAL AMOUNT CLAIMED 
*The claim is unsecured except to the extent that the security interest 
has value sufficient to satisfy it* 
*Mf priority is claimed, state basis under bankruptcy law: 
DATED: 5-19-86 
Clais Number 
(for office use only) 
Signatun 
Title 
gftfrg^. 
: M^JB&ISOQ rlabev. Attortfev for v,Lec 
( i f not signed by claimant peWpnal 
MARKING: Presenting a fraudulent claim in a bank-
ruptcy case i s a federal crime, bearing a penalty 
of a 55,000 maximum fine and imprisonment of up 
to five years . 18 U.S.C. 1152 
°& 
Appendix 8 
Duane H. Gillman 
Janet A. Goldstein 
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN, P.C. 
8 East Broadway Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re: 
BRUCE L. GILDEA, 
Debtor. 
DUANE H. GILLMAN, TRUSTEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SITTNER, j 
Defendant, 
• B M g g g g g " " ' ... i .i.i . J 
1
 • — — - — — — • — * » - — ' - - - • — — — • « ! • ' •• I 
Bankruptcy Case Kusber 
86A-00168 
[Chapter 7] 
Adversary Proceeding Nutr.ber 
89PA-0220 
STIPULATION 
The Plaintiff, Duane H. Gillman, Trustee of the estate of 
the above-named Debtor, and the Defendant, John C. Sittner, by 
and through their respective counsels of record, hereby stipulate 
to dismissal of this action under the following terras: 
1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives any right to 
assert a secured claim in and to any property of this estate or 
any funds which constitute proceeds of property of this estate 
and acknowledges that any and all claim he has is an unsecured, 
pre-petition claim. Defendant's rights respecting property 
f... ', <1 «•'' I il C v 
Br __. 
abandoned by the estate or not administered by closing are 
preserved and unaffected hereby. 
2. This case will be dismissed with prejudice after Court 
approval of the Stipulation. 
DATED this /fl day of August, 1989. 
• in >h* ,? p , e e c°.°y °< a document nn D u a n e H' Gillman 
Cen.iiv C!er!< X^C^ertsSrTffab^y
7 
'A t to rney fo r Defend 
^ 
CERTIFICA TE OFSER VICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, through the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following parties: 
WILLIAM D. MARSH, ESQ. (#2094) 
One Utah Center, Suite 900 
201 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)535-4659 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Karen H. Schriever 
GRANT W.P. MORRISON, ESQ. (#3666) 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-7999 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees Bruce & Shirlynn Gildea 
RANDALL E. GRANT (#1235) 
GRANT & GRANT, A.P.C. 
349 South 200 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)364-7777 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellees Joy Hale 
DATED this 24th day of August, 2000. 
12-Sittner a: \Remand\BriefHead 
